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INTRODUCTION
The United States is an outlier in the global copyright community
in giving plaintiffs in copyright cases the ability to elect, at any time
before final judgment, to receive an award of statutory damages,
which can be granted in any amount between $750 and $150,000
per infringed work.1 U.S. copyright law provides scant guidance
about where in that range awards should be made, other than to
say that the award should be in an amount the court "considers
just,"2 and that the upper end of the spectrum-from $30,000 to
$150,000 per infringed work-is reserved for "willful" infringers.3
Although Congress intended this designation to apply only in
"exceptional cases,"4 courts have interpreted willfulness so broadly
that those who merely should have known their conduct was
infringing are often treated as willful infringers.6
One might have expected courts to develop a jurisprudence to
guide them in accomplishing the largely compensatory goal that
has historically underlain the U.S. statutory damage remedy' or
to formulate meaningful criteria for awarding enhanced damages
in willful infringement cases. Unfortunately, this has not yet hap-
pened. Awards of statutory damages are frequently arbitrary, in-
consistent, unprincipled, and sometimes grossly excessive.'
1. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006). Statutory damages can, however, be reduced if the
defendant can prove he was an "innocent" infringer. Id. In practice, however, this virtually
never happens. See infra Parts I.B, II.B. To qualify for an award of statutory damages, a
copyright owner must have registered his or her work with the U.S. Copyright Office within
three months of publication. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2006); see also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.04[D] (2008). A separate article shows that few other
countries have statutory damages regimes for copyright law, and the U.S. is unique in its
approach to statutory damages. See Tara Wheatland, Copyright Statutory Damages: A Rarity
in the International Arena (Apr. 6, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006).
3. Id.
4. See S. REP. No. 94-473, at 144-45 (1975) (stating that enhanced damages should be
available in "exceptional cases"); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 162 (1975) (same).
5. See, e.g., Island Software & Computer Serv., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 413 F.3d 257,264
(2d Cir. 2005) (noting that constructive knowledge suffices to show willfulness).
6. Part L.A discusses the historical role of statutory damages in compensating copyright
owners for infringement when damages are difficult to prove.
7. Part II.C presents numerous examples of arbitrary, inconsistent, and excessive
statutory damage awards.
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Consider a few examples. In UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com,
Inc., a trial court held that the defendant had willfully infringed
copyrights by developing a database of music "ripped" from CDs
the firm had purchased, after which the judge announced his in-
tent to award statutory damages of $25,000 per infringed CD.'
Approximately 4,700 CDs were at issue in the case, for a potential
total award of over $118 million-despite the absence of any
evidence of actual harm to the plaintiffs or profits to the defendant.9
In another case, Elvin Feltner was initially held liable as a willful
infringer for his station's unauthorized broadcast of television
programs for which a court awarded the copyright owner statutory
damages of $20,000 per work, for a total award of $8.8 million."° On
appeal, Feltner argued that he had a right to a jury trial on the
issue of statutory damages, and the Supreme Court agreed with
him.1 On remand, Feltner got his jury trial, but the jury handed
down an even larger statutory damage award of $72,000 per work
for exactly the same acts of infringement, resulting in a total award
of over $31 million. 12 In a recent peer-to-peer (p2p) filesharing case,
Capitol Records v. Thomas-Rasset, a jury awarded $80,000 per
infringed song against an individual file-sharer, for a total award
8. No. 00 Civ. 472 (JSR), 2000 WL 1262568, at *1, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000).
9. We are not alone in our judgment that the award in the MP3.com case was grossly
excessive. See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, at § 14.04[E] [1] at 14-96 ("Absent any
nexus between damage to plaintiff and benefit to defendant at any magnitude even roughly
comparable to that awarded, the result is to introduce randomness or worse into the
litigation calculus."); WILLIAM F. PATRY, 6 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 22:181, at 22-434 (2009)
[hereinafter PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT] (stating that award in MP3.com was "hardly
necessary as a deterrent for a defendant who had not made a penny in profits off its use, and
where plaintiff had conceded that it could not prove any actual damages" and inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence on punitive awards). MP3.com
eventually reached a settlement agreement with UMG, and the court entered judgment in
the amount of $53.4 million. See Amy Harmon, Deal Settles Suit Against MP3.com, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2000, at Cl; see also infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text for further
discussion of the award in the MP3.com case.
10. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 106 F.3d
284, 288 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nom. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523
U.S. 340 (1998).
11. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 342-45.
12. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. v. Krypton Broad., Inc., 259 F.3d 1186, 1189 (9th
Cir. 2001). Patry has also criticized the ultimate statutory damage award against Feltner.
PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 9, § 22:190, at 22-451 to 22-452.
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of over $1.92 million, 3 despite the trial judge's recognition that
actual damages were approximately $50.14
In the modern world in which the average person in her day-to-
day life interacts with many copyrighted works in a way that may
implicate copyright law, the dangers posed by the lack of meaning-
ful constraints on statutory damage awards are acute. 5 Even a
defendant who presents a plausible fair use defense at trial may
find itself subject to large statutory damage awards.'6 Statutory
damage awards are particularly likely to be grossly excessive when
compared with actual damages in class action suits, or secondary
liability cases such as those against technology developers, where
the number of works potentially infringed is likely to be large.'7 In
such cases, the potential chilling effect on individuals and technol-
ogy providers alike is significant.18
13. Nate Anderson, Thomas Verdict: Willful Infringement, $1.92 Million Penalty,
ARSTECHNICA, June 18, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/06/jammie-
thomas-retrial-verdict.ars.
14. 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1213, 1227 (D. Minn. 2008) ('Thomas allegedly infringed on the
copyrights of 24 songs-the equivalent of approximately three CDs, costing less than $54.").
The trial judge vacated an earlier judgment resulting in a statutory damage award of
$220,000, in part out of concern that Congress may not have intended this sort of result. Id.
at 1227; see also J. Cam Barker, Note, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against
Illegal File-Sharing: The Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for
Copyright Infringement, 83 TEx. L. REV. 525, 525-26 (2004). Some jurors in the first Thomas
trial reportedly wanted to award $750 per infringed song, while others argued for $150,000
per song; they seemingly compromised on $9,250 per song. Posting of David Kravets to
Threat Level, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2007/10/riaa-juror-we-w/ (Oct. 9,2007, 11:17
EST). Although the $220,000 initial award represented a very high multiple over actual
damages, the second Thomas trial resulted in an even higher award of $80,000 per infringed
song. See Anderson, supra note 13. Even more recently, a jury returned a verdict against
another file-sharer at $22,500 per infringed song, for a total award of $675,000. See Ben
Sheffner, Oy Tenenbaum! RIAA Wins $675,000, or $22,500 Per Song, ARS TECHNICA, July 31,
2009, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/07/o-tenenbaum-riaa-wins-675000-or-
22500-per-song.ars.
15. See, e.g., John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the
Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REv. 537, 543-48 (2007) (giving examples of ordinary acts of
an ordinary person in an ordinary day that might, under some interpretations of copyright
law, be deemed infringing and result in daily liability exposure of $12.45 million per day or
$4.54 billion annually, even without engaging in any p2 p filesharing).
16. See, e.g., L.A. Times v. Free Republic, No. 98-7840 MMM AJWX, 2000 WL 1863566
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2000) (holding defendant liable for $1 million statutory damage award).
17. See, e.g., Stephanie Berg, Remedying the Statutory Damages Remedy for Secondary
Copyright Infringement Liability: Balancing Copyright and Innovation in the Digital Age, 56
J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 265, 268 (2009).
18. Id. at 316-24.
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Part I reviews the historical purposes of statutory damages
for copyright infringement and demonstrates that Congress in-
tended for statutory damages to be mainly compensatory in nature.
Abjuring the prior law's "per sheet penalty" remedy for infringe-
ment that had melded together penal, deterrent, and compensatory
functions,19 Congress in the Copyright Act of 1909 separated these
functions by creating a new criminal provision to punish infringe-
ments that were both willful and for profit, and by developing a
nonpenal statutory damage regime to provide compensation when
damages were difficult to prove and a range within which awards
could be made to deter infringement.2 ° In 1976, Congress made
anew the unfortunate mistake of melding together compensatory
and penal functions in the tripartite structure it established for
19. Although some courts, commentators, and litigators refer to these early per sheet
penalties as "statutory damages" and describe them as direct predecessors to the current
statutory damage provision, we think they are distinguishable. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures
Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 349-51 (1998); United States of America's Memorandum in
Defense of the Constitutionality of the Statutory Damages Provision of the Copyright Act,
17 U.S.C. § 504(c), at 3; Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (No. 06-CV-1497); Berg, supra note
17, at 274-76. While U.S. copyright law has provided a statutorily-set monetary remedy since
1790, the per sheet remedy first established in 1790 (and modeled on a similar provision in
the Statute of Anne, 1710) had a fundamentally different character than the statutory
damage regimes of the twentieth century. Under the Statute of Anne, the per sheet penalty
was available to anyone who brought a lawsuit under the copyright law, not just the owner
of the copyright in the infringed work. Under the 1790 Act, the per sheet remedy was
explicitly penal in nature, although it could be awarded in a civil case. This penalty was fixed
in one set amount without any regard to the actual damage incurred or the justice of that
award as applied in a particular case. Additionally, a successful plaintiff received half of the
per sheet penalty award; the other half went into the U.S. Treasury. Copyright Act of May
31, 1790, ch. 15, § 2, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (repealed 1802). And finally, when the per sheet
penalty carried over to subsequent enactments of the copyright laws, it carried a two-year
statute of limitations that did not apply to awards of actual damages or disgorgement of the
defendant's profits. See Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 100, 16 Stat. 198, 214 (penalty for
engravings), § 104, 16 Stat. 198, 215; Patterson v. J.S. Ogilvie Pub. Co., 119 F. 451, 453
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1902); cf. Tomds G6mez-Arostegui, What History Teaches Us About Copyright
Injunctions and the Inadequate-Remedy-at-Law Requirement, 81 So. CAL. L. REv. 1197, 1267-
77 (2008) (discussing penalties and damages in English common law courts before 1800).
Because of the quasi-criminal nature of the per sheet penalty, courts tended to construe the
provision quite strictly. See, e.g., Rogers v. Jewett, 20 F. Cas. 1114, 1115 (C.C.D. Mass. 1858)
(refusing to award a per sheet penalty because the defendant had copied part of the plaintiffs
book, not the whole of it, saying that any other construction of the statute "would hardly
consist [sic] with that principle that requires penal laws to be construed strictly").
20. See Copyright Act of 1909, § 25, 35 Stat. 1075, 1081-82 (damage recovery provision),
§ 28 (criminal provision), 35 Stat. 1075, 1082 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006));
see also Part L.A (further explaining this change).
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statutory damage awards under the Copyright Act of 1976: very
modest damages for the exceptional cases of innocent infringement,
a rather broad range of damages for ordinary infringement, and
enhanced levels of damages for the exceptional cases of willful
infringement. This tripartite structure has not been respected in
the case law. The application of statutory damages has too often
strayed from the largely compensatory impulse underlying statu-
tory damages for the first two categories, and has focused too
heavily on deterrence and punishment by holding many ordinary
infringements to be willful, which has resulted in many awards that
are punitive in effect and often in intent.
Part II explains the implications of the Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence dealing with due process limits on punitive damage awards
for statutory damage awards in copyright cases. 1 This Part gives
numerous examples of cases in which copyright statutory damage
awards are consistent with principles of due process; yet, there are
also many cases in which such awards are inconsistent with the
tripartite structure of the statutory damage regime and/or with due
process principles.
Part III shows that it is possible, working within the current
legal framework, to develop guidelines to ensure that statutory
damage awards are properly tailored to achieving the remedy's
goals. Drawing upon cases in which statutory damage awards have
been consistent with the tripartite structure of § 504(c) and the
Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence, Part III articulates
principles upon which a sound jurisprudence for copyright statutory
damage awards could be built. This Part also considers whether
legislative reform of U.S. statutory damage rules might be desir-
able.
21. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); BMW of
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). We are not the only commentators to raise due
process concerns about statutory damages in copyright cases. See, e.g., Blaine Evanson, Due
Process in Statutory Damages, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POLy 601, 628-37 (2005) (arguing that the
due process case law applies to statutory damage awards and giving copyright statutory
damage examples); Barker, supra note 14, at 542-54 (expressing due process concerns about
statutory damage awards in p2p filesharing cases).
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF STATUTORY DAMAGES IN U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW
Statutory damages in U.S. copyright law have historically been
intended to ensure that copyright owners could obtain at least some
measure of compensation when it was difficult to prove how much
damage they had suffered as a result of the defendants' infringe-
ments.22 Although Congress made some effort to cabin statutory
damage awards to avoid excessiveness in the Copyright Act of 1976,
the presence of the enhanced damage provision available for willful
infringements has led to an increasing number of awards that are
not only punitive in effect, but punitive in intent. This trend is
inconsistent with sound copyright policy and with Congress's intent
in adopting this provision.
A. Statutory Damages Under the 1909 Act
Some historical context is useful to understand the purposes of
the statutory damage regime established in the 1909 Act.23 During
22. The legislative history of the 1909 Act contains numerous expressions of concern
about the difficulties of proving actual damages or defendant's profits as a rationale for the
adoption of a statutory damage provision. See, e.g., STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS ATTHE THIRD SESSION OFTHE CONFERENCE ON COPYRIGHT (Mar. 13-16, 1906),
reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT pt. E, at 227-35 (E. Fulton
Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1976); see also Berg, supra note 17, at 279 ("These
discussions [in the 1909 Act legislative history] show that statutory damages were meant to
be compensatory to ensure that copyright owners would receive some award in the absence
of proof of actual damages but not punitive in nature."). There are a number of factors that
may contribute to difficulties of proof in copyright cases. The plaintiff may not be operating
in the market in which the defendant is exploiting her work; the defendant may not have
kept good records about its sales; it may be too expensive to prove damages with particularity
in relation to the amount that could be recovered. See generally H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
87TH CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW 102-03 (Comm. Print 1961), reprinted in 3 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (George S. Grossman ed., 1976) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE REGISTER
OF COPYRIGHTS].
23. The 1909 Act was not the first U.S. copyright statute to have a statutory damage
provision distinct from the per sheet penalty discussed supra note 19, although it was the
first federal law which made such a remedy available for infringement of all copyrighted
works. In preconstitutional days, a number of the U.S. colonies included range-based
statutory damages provisions in their copyright laws. See William F. Patry, The Right to a
Jury Trial in Copyright Cases, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 139, 150 (1981) [hereinafter
446
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the late eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth centuries, U.S.
law allowed copyright owners to be awarded a statutorily set
penalty of 500, later increased to $1, per infringing sheet found in
24the defendant's possession. For several decades, the per sheet
penalty was the only monetary remedy that could be obtained from
common law courts, although later amendments generally enabled
copyright owners to recover actual damages in common law
courts,25 or if the suit was brought in equity, an accounting of the
defendant's profits along with injunctive relief.26
The legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1909 is replete
with expressions of dissatisfaction with the per sheet remedy.27
This dissatisfaction was due in part to the penal character of this
remedy which caused courts to construe it narrowly, 2 and in part
Patry, Right to a Jury Trial]. In 1856, Congress amended the copyright law to allow
copyright owners to recover not less than $100 for the first, nor less than $50 for subsequent,
unauthorized public performances of dramatic compositions. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169,
11 Stat. 138 (1856). Further adoptions of specific statutory damage provisions followed in
1870 and 1895, but it was not until the 1909 Act that a comprehensive revision and
replacement of the per sheet penalty was accomplished. See Berg, supra note 17, at 276-77.
24. See Berg, supra note 17, at 275-76 (relating this history). U.S. lawmakers borrowed
the concept of the per sheet penalty for infringement from the British Statute of Anne of
1710. Id. at 273-74, n. 27. The Statute of Anne, in turn, borrowed this concept from the
Stationers Company's regulations of its member firms. See Walter L. Pforzheimer, Copyright
Reform and the Duffy Bill, 47 YALE L.J. 433, 436-37 (1938). See supra note 19 for a discussion
about why we do not consider the per sheet penalty to be analogous to the statutory damage
provisions in the 1909 or 1976 Acts.
25. But see Globe Newspaper Co. v. Walker, 210 U.S. 356, 367 (1908) (holding that
recovery for infringement of a map was limited to a per sheet penalty award forfeiture of
plates, and the right to proceed by injunction).
26. For a concise review of the damage provisions of U.S. copyright law prior to 1976,
see WILLIAM S. STRAUSS, COPYRIGHT OFFICE STUDY NO. 22: THE DAMAGE PROVISIONS OF THE
COPYRIGHT LAW (1956), reprinted in 2 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
at ix-13 (George S. Grossman ed., 2001). The law/equity distinction and its implications for
the award of monetary relief in copyright cases before the 1909 Act are explained in Patry,
Right to a Jury Trial, supra note 23, at 174; see also G6mez-Arostegui, supra note 19, at
1233, discussing similar topics with respect to pre-1800 English common law.
27. See, e.g., STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND SESSION OFTHE
CONFERENCE ON COPYRIGHT (Nov. 1-4, 1905), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
1909 COPYRIGHT ACT pt. D, at 243 (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1976) ("[l]n
some cases, although you can prove that an offender has had 100,000 copies of a work and
has disposed of every copy, ... you have no recovery for those copies disposed of yesterday.").
28. Because of the quasi-criminal nature of the per sheet penalty, courts had, for
instance, construed what constituted "a sheet" and copies "in possession of the defendant"
narrowly. See, e.g., Belles v. Outing, 175 U.S. 262 (1899) (only copies in the actual possession
of the defendant counted); Backus v. Gould, 48 U.S. 798 (1849) (narrowly construing "in
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to the rigidity of rules about which remedies for infringement
were available at law or in equity.29
Perhaps the most important remedial reform introduced in the
1909 Act was the new law's authorization for one civil lawsuit to be
brought in which actual damages and the defendant's profits (or the
"in lieu" damages to be discussed shortly) could be awarded, as well
as forfeiture of infringing copies and an injunction against future
infringements.
A second important reform was the elimination of the per sheet
penalty, whose previously penal functions were now served by a
criminal provision for willful infringements for profit,3 0 and whose
compensatory and deterrent functions were taken on by the avail-
ability of monetary relief for actual damages (for example, lost
license fees) and defendant's profits attributable to infringement.31
A third important reform was the creation of a new generalized
regime of statutory damages, available "in lieu" of actual damages
and profits, which could overcome the severe difficulties of proof of
damages and profits about which participants in the legislative
history had so vigorously complained."
Section 101(b) directed the courts to make such awards in an
amount that was "just," but it also set a range within which stat-
utory damage awards should be made: no less than $250 and up
to $5,000 per infringement. 3 To aid judges in determining the
possession"); Falk v. Heffron, 56 F. 299 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1893) (limiting penalty award to
"sheets" from which many copies had been printed); Taft v. Stephens Lithographing &
Engraving Co., 38 F. 28 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1889) (narrowly construing "sheet").
29. STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND SESSION OF THE
CONFERENCE ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 27, at 243-44, 257 (complaining about the need to
bring multiple suits to get effective relief in copyright cases). Moreover, sometimes recovery
at law was limited to the per sheet penalty. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co., 210 U.S. at 367.
30. Copyright Act of 1909, § 28, 35 Stat. 1075, 1082 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C.
§ 504(c) (2006)).
31. Id. § 25, 35 Stat. at 1081-82.
32. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1976) (superseded).
33. The $5,000 cap could, however, be lifted if the defendant continued to infringe after
receiving actual notice that the copyright owner regarded its acts as infringing. Id.; see also
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 14.04[F][2], at 14-121 to 14-124. What constituted a
single "infringement" for purposes of§ 101(b) was the subject of significant debate. STRAUSS,
supra note 26, at 7. It was partly this difficulty and the potential for excessive awards on a
"per infringement" basis that caused Congress to shift to a "per work" model of awarding
statutory damages under the 1976 Act. See infra Part I.B.
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appropriate amount of compensatory statutory damages within
this range, § 101(b) suggested specific amounts for common types
of infringements (for example, $10 for every infringing copy of a
painting, statue, or sculpture; $1 per infringing copy of other
works; $50 for every infringing performance of a lecture, sermon,
or address; $10 for every infringing performance of a musical com-
position, and so on).34 Newspapers and motion picture studios
persuaded Congress to cap their potential liability for unwitting
infringements. 5 Section 101(b) also explicitly stated that statutory
damages "shall not be regarded as a penalty."36
Cases interpreting this new provision articulated its purpose as
granting fair compensation to copyright owners when "the rules of
law render difficult or impossible proof of damages or discovery of
profits."37 In keeping with this purpose, some courts refused to
order defendants to pay statutory damages when actual damages
or profits could be proven.38 Indeed, the Supreme Court held that
the 1909 Act's statutory damage provision was inapplicable when
damages and profits were proven.39 If a successful plaintiff had
34. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1976) (superseded). These "yardsticks," as they were often called,
were intended merely as a guide and were not mandatory on the courts. See NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 1, § 14.04[F][3].
35. Unwitting infringements of photographs in newspapers could give rise to statutory
damages between $50 and $200; statutory damage awards for infringement of undramatized
or nondramatic works in motion pictures were capped at $100. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1976)
(superseded).
36. Id. This language was mainly intended to distinguish the 1909 Act's statutory
damage rule from the per sheet penalty, and in particular, to ensure that the strict rules of
construction that attended penalties at common law would not be used in the new regime.
See LEON H. AMDUR, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE § 29, at 1157-58 (1936); R.R. BOWKER,
COPYRIGHT, ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW 265-66, 271-72 (1912); ARTHUR W. WEIL, AMERICAN
COPYRIGHT LAW § 1267, at 477 (1917). But the legislative history of the 1909 Act also shows
there was considerable concern expressed about the potential risk that statutory damage
awards could be excessive and punitive. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 17, at 278-87.
37. See, e.g., Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207, 209 (1935); see also NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 1, § 14.04[F] [1] [A]. Under prior law, strict rules requiring precise proof
of damages and profits had sometimes resulted in undercompensating copyright owners and
insufficient deterrence of infringement. See, e.g., Douglas, 294 U.S. at 209.
38. See, e.g., Zeigelheim v. Flohr, 119 F. Supp. 324, 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1954) (awarding the
plaintiff $1,700 in actual damages and profits rather than statutory damages, which would
have amounted to $4,100).
39. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1940); see also
Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 378 (9th Cir. 1947) (rejecting
defendant's argument that statutory damages should be awarded because actual damages
2009] 449
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suffered only nominal or no damage, the minimum of $250 might
be awarded, but no more, in keeping with the policy that statutory
damages should not be a penalty.4" Courts sometimes also refused
to impose any statutory damages when the evidence showed no
harm to the copyright owner and no profits to the infringer.4' In
keeping with the no-penalty rule, appellate courts sometimes
reduced large statutory damage awards to the minimum in close,
although ultimately unsuccessful, fair use cases.42 Occasionally,
appellate courts reduced statutory damage awards that were
excessive in relation to approximate damages or profits.43
We base our conclusion that statutory damages under the 1909
Act were mainly compensatory in purpose on several factors. First,
the structure of § 101(b) identifies actual damages and defendant's
profits as the primary remedies for infringement, and statutory
damages as an "in lieu" remedy. Second, the legislative history of
the 1909 Act, as well as the case law interpreting it, view the pri-
mary impetus for adopting statutory damages as providing some
relief when damages and/or profits are difficult to prove. Third, in
addition to providing a range within which statutory damage
awards should be made and setting a cap to prevent excessive
awards, § 101(b) proffered guidelines for what Congress considered
to be reasonable damages for various types of works. Fourth, the
case law interpreting the 1909 Act's statutory damage provision
were too conjectural). However, courts sometimes awarded statutory damages under the
1909 Act without requiring plaintiffs to try to prove actual damages or profits. See STRAUSS,
supra note 26, at 8-9. And in some cases, courts awarded statutory damages when
defendant's profits were proven but there was uncertainty as to the plaintiffs lost profits.
See, e.g., F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 234 (1952).
40. See, e.g., Russell & Stoll Co. v. Oceanic Elec. Supply Co., 80 F.2d 864, 865 (2d Cir.
1936).
41. See, e.g., Wash. Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 140 F.2d 465, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1942). Courts also
tended to award minimum statutory damages when there was no deliberate intent to
infringe. See STRAUSS, supra note 26, at 12-13 (citing and discussing cases).
42. See, e.g., MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that the live
performance of a raunchy version of a popular song infringed copyright).
43. See, e.g., Turner & Dahnken v. Crowley, 252 F. 749, 754 (9th Cir. 1918) (reducing
$7,000 statutory damage award to $560, which the court estimated was the defendant's profit
from infringement). In cases such as Turner, when application of the minimum per-copy
statutory damage for a work of that kind would produce "exorbitant statutory damages in
comparison with actual damages and would, in fact, amount to a penalty, the courts, as
permitted by section 101(b), exercise their discretion in arriving at an equitable result."
STRAUSS, supra note 26, at 11.
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generally focused on its compensatory function and respected the
"no penalty" direction. This is not to say that statutory damage
awards under the 1909 Act lacked deterrent purposes and func-
tions. By setting a floor of $250 and giving courts discretion to
award up to $5,000, Congress surely intended to deter infringe-
ment, but the compensatory impulse was most evident in the law
as applied.
B. Statutory Damages Under the 1976 Act
In the early 1950s, Congress commenced considering a substan-
tial revision of U.S. copyright law." The Register of Copyrights
identified the 1909 Act's statutory damage provision as among the
provisions in need of significant reform.45
Section 504(c), which codified the new statutory damage provi-
sion of the 1976 Act, is similar in some important respects to its
cousin in the 1909 Act. Under both laws, statutory damages are
available only "in lieu" of awards of actual damages and the de-
fendant's profits; a successful plaintiff could, in other words, get
statutory damages or actual damages and defendant's profits but
not all three. 46 Both laws also set a range of minimum and maxi-
mum amounts for such awards, as well as directing courts to choose
a statutory damage award within the range that would be "just. 47
Congress made several changes in the new statutory damage
regime that were intended to curb the potential for excessively large
awards and strengthen the compensatory purposes of such awards;
44. Congress began this process by authorizing and providing funding for the Copyright
Office to commission a set of studies about various aspects of U.S. copyright law, including
one on damages. See STRAUSS, supra note 26, at 8-9.
45. See REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 22, at 103-06. The Report
recommended that a revised statutory damage regime not adopt a schedule of specific
amounts of statutory damages for particular kinds of works akin to that in § 101(b), that the
high end of the statutory damage range be increased, and that provision be made for lesser
awards against innocent infringers. Id. The Patry treatise gives a synopsis of the stages
through which the revision of the statutory damages rules passed before the 1976 Act was
adopted. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 9, §§ 22:154 to 22:162, 22:386 to 22:402.
46. Courts have occasionally made mistakes and granted all three types of awards. See,
e.g., Roy Exp. Co. v. CBS, Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d
Cir. 1982) (awarding $5,000 in statutory damages as well as $7,280 in actual damages for
broadcaster's use of clips in connection with news story about Charlie Chaplin).
47. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006).
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yet, it also created a new higher range for statutory damages that
could be awarded against willful infringers, which unfortunately
opened up opportunities for excessive awards far beyond congressio-
nal intent.4"
1. Respects in Which Congress Limited Statutory Damage
In at least five respects, the statutory damage provision of the
1976 Act reflects congressional efforts to cabin or narrow possible
excesses in the awarding of statutory damages. First, § 504(c)
allows courts to award statutory damages below the ordinary
minimum in cases of innocent infringement-that is, when the
defendant reasonably believed that his acts were noninfringing.49
Second, § 504(c) allows courts to remit statutory damages entirely
for nonprofit educational users or public broadcasters who had
reason to believe their uses were noninfringing5 0 Third, the 1976
Act limits the availability of statutory damage awards to those who
register their claims of copyright within three months of publica-
tion.5 ' This requirement caused statutory damages to take on a new
purpose in U.S. copyright law, namely to induce prompt registra-
tion.5" No matter how difficult it may be to prove actual damages
48. Id.
49. Id. The 1909 Act had authorized lower minimum awards for innocent infringement
in some specific contexts, but lacked a general lower bound for innocent infringers. The
Register's Report in 1961 recommended a general provision that would have given courts
discretion to lower statutory damage awards against innocent infringers. REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 22, at 104. The 1976 Act allowed the $250 minimum
statutory damage award to be reduced to $100 for innocent infringement. Subsequent
amendments increased the ordinary infringement minimum to $750 and the innocent
infringement minimum to $200. To qualify for this lower award, a defendant must prove that
"he was not aware and had no reason to believe that his acts constituted an infringement of
copyright." NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 14.04[B][2]. As Part II.B shows, this innocent
infringement provision of the 1976 Act is virtually never used.
50. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006). We found no evidence that this provision has ever been
utilized in a litigated case.
51. Id. § 412 (requiring registration within three months of publication to qualify for
awards of statutory damages and attorney fees). This requirement does not apply, however,
to lawsuits aimed at enforcing the moral rights provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 106A. There is also
a special provision as to works unpublished prior to the infringement. Id. § 412.
52. See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 329 F. Supp. 2d 568, 570 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("If punitive
damages [were] available to a plaintiff who did not timely register [his] work, the statutory
purpose of encouraging copyright registration [would be] frustrated.").
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or a defendant's profits attributable to infringement, and no matter
how egregious the acts of infringement, late-registering copyright
owners under the 1976 Act qualify for only these remedies. Fourth,
§ 504(c) provides that infringement of a compilation of independ-
ently copyrighted works (for example, an edited book consisting of
chapters written by many authors) should be treated as a single
copyrighted work for purposes of statutory damages.53
The most significant respect in which Congress sought to narrow
statutory damage awards in the 1976 Act was in its adoption of a
rule that such awards should be made "per infringed work,"54
instead of the "per infringement" rule that had been in place under
the 1909 Act.5 5 The legislative history of the 1976 Act reveals that
Congress was persuaded that the "per infringement" standard had
sometimes resulted in excessive awards. 6 The change to a "per
infringed work" standard was intended to lessen this risk.
Unfortunately, these changes to the statutory damage regime
of U.S. copyright law have had somewhat different effects than
Congress expected. For example, more than thirty years after the
effective date of the 1976 Act, it is apparent that the innocent
infringer provisions may be useful in deterring lawsuits against
innocent infringers. However, this part of the statutory damage
53. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006). The recording industry recently tried to persuade Congress
to revise the statutory damage provision to repeal this restriction on statutory damage
awards, but the effort was ultimately unsuccessful. See Nate Anderson, Rep. Berman Pulls
Controversial "Compilations" Rule from PRO-IP Act, ARSTECHNICA, Mar. 6, 2008, http://
arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2008103/rep-berman-pulls-controversial-compilations-rule-
from-pro-ip-act.ars.
54. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006). Under the "per work" rule, even when there are multiple
copyright owners and multiple defendants engaged in multiple infringements of multiple
exclusive rights, there can only be one statutory damage award. Joint tortfeasors will be
jointly and severally liable for that one award. See S. REP. 94-473, at 144 (1975).
55. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (superseded); see, e.g., NiMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1,
§ 14.04[El[2][a] (discussing "per infringement" statutory damage cases).
56. See STRAUSS, supra note 26, at 11-12. The problem was particularly acute in the case
of "mass communication," for example, radio and later television. Id. at 12. In the case of
networked radio stations, "a performance by each station constituted a separate
infringement. Such decisions have sometimes awarded what may be considered
disproportionately high damages." Id. (citing Select Theaters Corp. v. Ronzoni Macaroni Co.,
59 U.S.P.Q. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)); see also REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra
note 22, at 104-05 (discussing the desirability of a "per work" standard to curb the potential
for exorbitant awards).
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framework has virtually no significance in litigation, not even in
the fair use context.57
The prompt registration requirement for statutory damages has
not become a meaningful inducement to registration for all authors
who value copyright protection, but rather a substantial boon to
major copyright industry players-the commercial exploiters of
copyrighted works whose rights largely derive from the Act's work
for hire rules or assignments from authors.5" Because individual
authors and small firms do not typically register their copyrights
within three months of publication, they rarely qualify for statu-
tory damages or attorney's fee awards. The prospect of enhanced
damages if their copyright is infringed-an eventuality that authors
dearly hope will never occur, but which may happen at some point
in the distant future-is too remote to induce prompt registrations.
Well-financed commercial exploiters of copyrighted works, on the
other hand, benefit from the statutory damage scheme, which they
are sometimes able to use with considerable success to strike terror
into the heart of anyone with the temerity to make unauthorized
uses of their copyrights.59 Copyright-savvy firms can infringe
copyrights of individual authors of unregistered or late-registered
works with relatively little risk, given that the costs of litigation are
likely to be greater than any damage award the unregistered
authors might ultimately be awarded for infringement. "Little guy"
authors thus, in theory, have the same strong legal rights as major
57. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the rarity of innocent infringement cases. In
none of the close fair use cases in which statutory damages were awarded under the 1976 Act
did any court, or jury, award the lower amounts that § 504(c) permits, although courts
sometimes awarded the ordinary infringement minimum when they believed the defendant
thought he was making a fair use. See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513,
554 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). For an excellent account of the history of concerns about imposing
liability for unwitting infringement, and an argument that our current copyright regime does
far too little to address such concerns, see R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in U.S.
Copyright Law: A History, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTs 133 (2006).
58. See, e.g., Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485,
495-96 (2004) (citing evidence of low registration rates). For a detailed exposition of the way
in which the registration requirement for statutory damages privileges the interests of
sophisticated rights holders at the expense of smaller, less sophisticated creators, see John
Tehranian, The Emperor Has No Copyright: Registration, Cultural Hierarchy and the Myth
of American Copyright Militancy 8-18 (Aug. 4, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
authors).
59. See infra Part II.C-D.
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copyright industry players, but they effectively do not have the
means to obtain relief when their rights are infringed."
The switch to a "per infringed work" rule may also have had
less of a limiting effect than Congress expected. It does, of course,
limit the statutory damage exposure of some firms (for example,
the seller of millions of counterfeit Barbie dolls or the television
network that broadcasts a single infringing program via many sta-
tions). The "per work" rule has, however, had far less of a limiting
impact than its proponents may have anticipated for five primary
reasons: (1) the range within which awards can be made is much
wider under the 1976 Act than under the 1909 Act;6' (2) Congress
has twice further raised statutory damage minima and maxima;
6 2
(3) there is virtually no guidance about how to make just awards
within that wide range; (4) courts have stretched the concept of
"willful" infringement so that virtually all ordinary infringers are
at risk of excessive statutory damage awards; and (5) Congress did
not anticipate many circumstances in which a per work rule would
lead to excessive liability, as it has in recent p2p filesharing cases, 3
or excessive risk of liability, as in class actions, secondary liability,
and/or new technology cases such as Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.
6 4
60. See, e.g., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, ACCORD: ADVISORY COMMI'TEE ON COPYRIGHT
REGISTRATION AND DEPOSIT, REPORT OF THE CO-CHAIRS ROBERT WEDGEWORTH & BARBARA
RINGER 17-19 (1993) (discussing hardships for authors and small firms because of § 412 and
the prompt registration requirement for awards of statutory damages and attorney fees; also
recognizing that a repeal of § 412 would bring about "a flood of infringement claims").
61. The ratio of high to low awards under the 1909 Act was 20:1, with a $250 minimum
and a $5,000 maximum. The ratio of high to low statutory damage awards under the 1976
Act is now 40:1 for ordinary infringement, with a minimum of $750 and a maximum of
$30,000. The ratio is 200:1 taking into account the $150,000 maximum, or 750:1, with the
$200 minimum for innocent infringers.
62. Congress doubled the statutory minima and maxima in 1989: from $250 to $500 as
a minimum, from $10,000 to $20,000 for the maximum for ordinary infringement, and from
$50,000 to $100,000 for the maximum for willful infringements. It raised them by a further
50 percent in 1999. See Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act
of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-160, 113 Stat. 1774 (1999); Berne Convention Implementation Act
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). At least one commentator has noted that
these changes have roughly tracked inflation. See Barker, supra note 14, at 533 & n.53.
63. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
64. 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (rejecting Universal's claim that Sony was liable for contributory
infringement because of infringing uses of its Betamax video taping device); see, e.g., Jessica
Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 917, 930 (2005) (discussing the
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One additional significant change in the U.S. statutory damage
regime since 1976 that has contributed to the potential for excessive
statutory damage awards occurred without any action by Congress.
Although § 504(c) can be interpreted as deeming statutory damage
awards to be equitable in nature,65 the Supreme Court ruled in
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. that litigants have a
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial as to statutory damages.66
It is still quite common for judges to render statutory damage
awards, but after Feltner, juries now also play a significant role in
awarding statutory damages. As Capital Records v. Thomas-Rasset
aptly illustrates,6" Feltner has exacerbated the potential for ex-
cessive and arbitrary awards when skillful lawyers are able to
persuade juries to become outraged about infringing conduct.
Actual damages in the Thomas-Rasset case were about $50.68 The
jury had no choice, given the implausibility of an innocent in-
fringement defense, but to award Capitol Records at least $750
per infringed work (which would have totaled $18,000). But the
320:1 ratio of actual damages from infringement to the minimum
statutory damage award did not suffice for the Thomas-Rasset jury
who instead awarded Capitol Records $1.92 million for her infringe-
ment.69
potentially massive statutory damage award that might have been levied against Sony as one
reason why the Court was reluctant to affirm the Ninth Circuit's ruling that Sony was a
contributory infringer). Congress's concerns about the "per-infringement" rule during the
1976 Act revision centered around the potential for high liability for technologies developed
since the last copyright revision-radio and television: "While the awarding of statutory
damages in cases of multiple infringement has not created any difficulties if the infringement
is by copying in printed publications, there is a problem in cases of infringing performances
of musical or dramatic works in network broadcasts." STRAUSS, supra note 26, at 11.
Congress did not anticipate the future prevalence of technologies that could result in
similarly unfairly aggregated awards under the new "per work" rule.
65. Section 504(c) refers to "the court" as the determiner of statutory damages and the
standard for determining the proper amount as that which is "just." 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006).
The overwhelming majority of statutory damage awards prior to Feltner had been rendered
by judges, and some courts had concluded that statutory damages were equitable in nature.
See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1177 (9th Cir.
1977). But see Patry, Right to a Jury Trial, supra note 23, at 194 (arguing that copyright
statutory damages are not equitable in nature).
66. 523 U.S. 340, 355 (1998).
67. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. This award was roughly ten times the
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2. Respects in Which Congress Broadened Statutory Damages
Although Congress narrowed statutory damages in the respects
discussed above, it also broadened the statutory damage provision
in several ways that benefit successful plaintiffs. First, Congress
increased the statutory damage award maximum.7" Second, the
1976 Act gave plaintiffs the right to elect statutory damages at any
time during the litigation, up until the entry of final judgment.71
Third, the statute no longer gave examples of appropriate amounts
of statutory damages for common types of infringements as to
specific types of works.72 Fourth, § 504(c) omitted the part of
statutory damage award rendered in the first Thomas trial, which the judge thought was
excessive:
While the Court does not discount Plaintiffs' claim that, cumulatively, illegal
downloading has far-reaching effects on their businesses, the damages awarded
in this case are wholly disproportionate to the damages suffered by Plaintiffs.
Thomas allegedly infringed on the copyrights of 24 songs-the equivalent of
approximately three CDs, costing less than $54, and yet the total damages
awarded is $222,000-more than five hundred times the cost of buying 24
separate CDs and more than four thousand times the cost of three CDs. While
the Copyright Act was intended to permit statutory damages that are larger
than the simple cost of the infringed works in order to make infringing a far
less attractive alternative than legitimately purchasing the songs, surely
damages that are more than one hundred times the cost of the works would
serve as a sufficient deterrent.
Capital Records v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1227 (D. Minn. 2008). The consistency of
the statutory damage award in the Thomas case with due process principles is considered
infra in Part II.
70. Initially, the 1976 Act doubled the general maximum statutory damage to $10,000.
Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 504(c), 90 Stat. 2585 (1976) (codified as amended at U.S.C. § 504(c)
(2006)). Subsequent amendments to § 504(c) have increased it to $30,000 per infringed work.
See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
71. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006). This change takes the decision about whether a statutory
damage is appropriate away from the judge; it also allows plaintiffs to surprise defendants
late in the litigation. A defendant who thinks its exposure is limited to a lost license fee and
any profits attributable to infringement, because that is all the complaint requested as relief,
may be unpleasantly surprised by a last minute switch to statutory damages when the judge
seems to be warming to the plaintiff's case. The Nimmer treatise reports that the Feltner
decision probably precludes an election of statutory damages after a jury award with which
the copyright owner is dissatisfied. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 14.04 [A] at 14-66, 14-
67.
72. One might speculate that this omission was due to the larger range of works and
types of infringements that were in contemplation in 1976 as compared with 1909. Oddly
enough, however, it appears that leaving the examples of specific damages per type of
infringement out of the statute was considered desirable as a way of avoiding excessive
awards. See REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 22, at 104. Over time,
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§ 101(b) that provided that statutory damages are not intended as
a penalty.
These two latter omissions become more pregnant when con-
sidered in light of the fifth and most significant pro-plaintiff
broadening of the 1976 Act's statutory damage provision: the
addition of a much higher maximum for statutory damage awards
against a newly created category of "willful infringers. '' 71 For
ordinary infringements, the 1976 Act allowed awards between $250
and $10,000 per infringed work, but it authorized awards of up to
$50,000 per infringed work for willful infringements.7 4 The legis-
lative history reflects an expectation that these enhanced damages
would be awarded only in "exceptional cases,' 75 a category which we
think Congress intended to encompass cases involving counterfeit-
ers, repeat infringers, and the like.
Subsequent amendments have increased the range for what are
presumably ordinary acts of infringement from $250 to $750 as the
minimum and from $10,000 to $30,000 per infringed work as the
maximum.7 The minimum-to-maximum range under the 1909 Act
yielded a 20:1 ratio.77 The current range for ordinary infringement
doubles that for a 40:1 ratio between the smallest and largest
authorized awards.7" Now that the willful infringement maximum
however, the effect of this omission has been to unmoor statutory damages from its largely
compensatory roots and purposes.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006). Oddly enough, this change was in part motivated by a
desire to limit excessive awards. Under the 1909 Act, there was no cap on statutory damage
awards that could be made against infringers who continued their wrongful acts after
receiving notice of their alleged infringement. Section 504(c), by contrast, had a cap on
awards for willful infringement, and as compared with the 1909 Act, it protected those who
reasonably thought their acts were noninfringing despite getting notice that the copyright
owner thought otherwise from excessive awards. REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS,
supra note 22, at 105.
74. Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 504(c), 90 Stat. 2541, 2585 (1976) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 504(c) 2006)).
75. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
76. See Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999, Pub.
L. No. 106-160, 113 Stat. 1774 (1999); Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). These changes have roughly tracked inflation. See
Barker, supra note 14, at 533 & n.53.
77. See 1909 Copyright Act, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
78. 113 Stat. 1774 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006)). Of course, if the
actual damage from ordinary infringement of that work is $1 (or less), the ratio of actual
harm to the maxiumum authorized statutory damage award would be up to (or more than)
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is $150,000 per infringed work, the ratio rises to 200:1,' 9 or 750:1 if
one considers also the innocent infringer provision.8 °
Exactly where in this very broad range any particular statutory
award will be rendered is anybody's guess. There are no criteria in
the statute to provide guidance, and courts have yet to develop a
meaningful jurisprudence to calibrate how to render "just" statutory
damage awards. It is also quite worrisome that judges are generally
reluctant to scrutinize or reduce excessive awards rendered by
juries."'
The risk of arbitrary and excessive awards enabled by the
exceptionally broad range for statutory damage awards is all the
greater because Congress did not define the term "willful" in rela-
tion to statutory damage awards. While this term clearly applies to
counterfeiters and repeat infringers, 2 courts have largely ignored
Congress's direction to award enhanced damages only in "excep-
tional cases." 3 Courts have interpreted willfulness expansively such
that infringement may be deemed willful if the defendant should
have known his conduct was infringing.8 4 Judges have even found
infringement to be willful as to defendants who proffered plausible,
if ultimately unsuccessful, fair use defenses.
8 5
30,000 times the harm. § 504(c)(1).
79. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006). The actual harm to maximum statutory damage award
ratio may be closer to 150,000:1 for very small scale infringements (for example, a song
available from iTunes for 990). Id.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., SESAC, Inc. v. WPNT, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 531 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (denying
motion for a new trial on damages).
82. See, e.g., Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Ketchum, 830 F. Supp. 1443, 1445 (M.D. Fla. 1993)
(seller of counterfeit games was willful infringer); RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp.
849, 856-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (large scale counterfeiter was willful infringer); Pret-a-Printee,
Ltd. v. Allton Knitting Mills, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. 150, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (repeat infringer
was willful infringer).
83. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006).
84. See, e.g., NUIMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 14.04[B] [3] [a] (citing cases).
85. See, e.g., Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1543-45
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding commercial photocopy service to be willful infringer for making
copies of copyrighted texts for college coursepacks); see also Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301,
313 (2d Cir. 1992) (characterizing defendant artist as an egregious and willful infringer and
suggesting that on remand the plaintiff should request an award of statutory damages, even
though his fair use defense was plausible). Lax standards for willful infringement have other
potentially deleterious effects, including effects on the defendant's ability to recover from his
insurance company or discharge his debts in bankruptcy. See, e.g., In re Braun, 327 B.R. 447,
452 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2005); see also PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 9, § 22:180,
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For all intents and purposes, the tripartite structure Congress
thought it was creating through the 1976 Act's statutory damage
provision-quite modest awards against innocent infringers, in-
cluding those who genuinely thought their use was fair or otherwise
privileged, moderate awards against ordinary infringers, and large
awards against the truly bad actors 86 -has devolved into a regime
in which the innocent infringer provision is essentially never used,
and willful infringement is commonly found in cases when infringe-
ment should properly be deemed ordinary.
As Part II will show in greater detail, there is little consistency
in the case law on copyright statutory damages. Some unquestion-
ably willful infringers (e.g., counterfeiters) have been ordered to pay
87quite minimal statutory damages, while some ordinary infringers,
including putative fair users, have been held liable as willful
infringers and sometimes subjected to maximum awards when
actual damages were minimal or nonexistent.88
Although Congress did not specifically state that it intended
awards within the newly established upper range to be punitive,
courts have sometimes interpreted them as so. 89 The omission of
at 22-429.
86. Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 504(c), 90 Stat. 2541, 2585 (1976) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006)).
87. See, e.g., Arclightz & Films Pvt. Ltd. v. Video Palace, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 356, 362-
63 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding sale of counterfeit motion pictures was willful infringement, but
statutory damage award of $750 per infringed movie was adequate deterrence under the
circumstances). In counterfeit video game cases, statutory damage awards have been far
under the maximum. See, e.g., Ketchum, 830 F. Supp. at 1445 (awarding $2,000 for each of
twelve works infringed).
88. See, e.g., Macklin v. Mueck, 373 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1336 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (awarding
$300,000 in statutory damages on a default judgment for posting two poems on the Internet);
see also L.A. Times, Inc. v. Free Republic, No. 98-7840 MMM AJWX, 2000 WL 1863566, at
*3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16,2000) (awarding $1 million in statutory damages against plausible fair
user who posted news articles on nonprofit conservative site inviting commentary on their
liberal bias).
89. See, e.g., On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2001) ("The purpose of
punitive damages-to punish and prevent malicious conduct-is generally achieved under
the Copyright Act through the provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2), which allow increases to
an award of statutory damages in cases of willful infringement."); Nat'l Football League v.
PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 131 F. Supp. 2d 458, 478 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that
statutory damages are "partly punitive"); U.S. Media Corp. v. Edde Entm't Corp., No. 94 Civ.
4849 (MBM) MHD, 1998 WL 401532, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1998) ("[A] statutory damage
award .... is designed to serve both compensatory and punitive purposes."); RSO Antenna
Television, A.E. v. Agean Video Inc., No. 95-CV-2328 ERK, 1996 WL 298252, at *8 (E.D.N.Y.
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the old "no penalty" rule of the 1909 Act seems to have reinforced
this trend.9" In one case involving a plausible joint work defense, for
instance, the judge concluded that the defendant playwright was a
willful infringer and referred to the $30,000 award against her as
"primarily punitive in nature."'" The legislative history of the 1999
amendments to § 504(c) is peppered with statements about the need
for "stringent deterrents" and increased "penalties" for infringe-
ment.
92
One commentator has observed that the enhanced damages
range for willful infringement "as employed, thus ha[s] a punitive
character, since [it is] used to punish an infringer for [its] willful-
ness."93 As the Supreme Court has noted in another context, "a civil
sanction that cannot be fairly be said solely to serve a remedial
purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment."94 Insofar as
Apr. 23, 1996) ("To the extent that Congress intended the Copyright Act to contain provisions
for punitive damages, such provisions are found in the statutory damages sections of the
Act."); RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating that
statutory damages are "partially punitive'); Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp.,
534 F. Supp. 69, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ('The public policy rationale for punitive damages of
punishing and preventing malicious conduct can be properly accounted for in the provisions
for increasing a maximum statutory damage award [for willful infringements]."); Rodgers v.
Quests, Inc., 213 U.S.P.Q. 212, 219 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (characterizing enhanced statutory
damage award for willful infringement as "punitive'); see also Evanson, supra note 21, at 627
n. 175 (noting that the judge had instructed the jury in one excessive award case that it could
use statutory damages to punish the defendant).
90. At least one court has opined that this omission signaled that Congress intended the
enhanced damage provision to provide punishment for infringement. See Rodgers, 213
U.S.P.Q. at 220 ("Significantly, clause (1) [of § 504(c)] omits the caveat of the prior Act that
statutory damages 'shall not be regarded as a penalty."').
91. Childress v. Taylor, 798 F. Supp. 981, 996-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding infringement
when, after initial collaboration fell apart, one dramatist developed a separate play).
92. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 106-216, at 2 (1999). The main purpose of the legislation was
to amend the enhanced damages part of § 504(c), but it also aimed to stiffen criminal
sentencing guidelines in copyright cases. Id.
93. Markdta Trimble Landovi, Punitive Damages in Copyright Infringement Actions
Under the U.S. Copyright Act, 2009 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 108, 109; see also Evanson,
supra note 21, at 632-37 (characterizing awards in some copyright statutory damage cases
as punitive); Patry, Right to a Jury Trial, supra note 23, at 194 (referring to the "penal"
nature of the enhanced damage provision of § 504(c)); Barker, supra note 14, at 526 (noting
the "punitive effect" of even the statutory damage minimum when applied to peer-to-peer
filesharing).
94. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993) (quoting United States v. Halper,
490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)).
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statutory damage awards frequently are awarded at very large
multiples over actual damages or defendant's profits, it is fair to
infer that such statutory damage awards are, in fact, punitive in
character.
Even when judges or juries do not explicitly say they are intent
on punishing defendants, the awards they sometimes make are
punitive in effect. How else can one explain the $53.4 million award
against MP3.com, which was based on the firm's "ripping" the
music from CDs into a database so that MP3.com could "beam"
these songs to clients who already owned the CDs in question or
who were purchasing them simultaneously with the beaming?95
MP3.com had purchased the CDs from which it ripped the music,
as had its clients, so the plaintiffs had already obtained some com-
pensation from the defendant and its intended customer base.9
MP3.com's fair use defense was somewhat bold and aggressive but
not completely implausible,97 and it had made little or no profit on
this service because MP3.com suspended the service while UMG's
lawsuit was litigated.98
The $1 million statutory damage award in Los Angeles Times,
Inc. v. Free Republic is similarly difficult to explain except as an
infliction of punishment on a nonprofit conservative commentary
site for posting some articles from the Washington Post and the Los
Angeles Times in an effort to illustrate liberal bias in the media.9
That this lawsuit was later settled for $10,000°° shows how out of
proportion the statutory damage award was. Because Free Republic
95. See, e.g., Christopher Stern, MP3.com To Pay Universal $53 Million, WASH. POST,
Nov. 15, 2000, at E3; Michael Landau, "Statutory Damages" in Copyright Law and the
MP3.com Case, GIGALAw, Oct. 2000, http://chnm.gmu.edu/digitalhistorylinks/cached/
chapter7/link7.24b.statutorycopyrightdamages.html (noting awards like that in the MP3.com
case are meant to send a strong message, 'DO NOT INFRINGE!" and to "sting' or make it
hurt").
96. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(discussing the service MP3.com had designed).
97. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE
HYBRID ECONOMY 134-35 (2008) (discussing MP3.com's service). MP3.com thought it was
facilitating lawful personal uses of music akin to the facilitation of personal uses held lawful
in the Sony Betamax case. Id.; see also MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 350-51.
98. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 352.
99. No. CV 98-7840 MMM (AJWx), 2000 WL 565200, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2000).
100. See Stipulation for Entry of Amended Final Judgment, Los Angeles Times, Inc. v.
Free Republic, No. 98-7840 NMM (AJWx) (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2002).
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raised a plausible fair use defense-and, indeed, a First Amend-
ment defense as well'1-0 -one might have expected a minimal
statutory damage award. Free Republic was not a profit-making
entity, and the lost profits claimed by the newspapers were spec-
ulative. 1
0 2
The $19.7 million jury award in Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg
Mason is even more difficult to understand except in punitive
terms. °3 Legg Mason was a subscriber to Lowry's financial news-
letters whose research staff had made copies of some newsletters
for their internal use.' 4 The jury ruled against Legg Mason's
argument that this internal copying from 240 works was fair use.1
0 5
After concluding that the infringement was willful, the jury im-
posed an award that amounted to roughly $82,000 per infringed
work.'0 6 Legg Mason's fair use defense 0 7 was not implausible.1
0 8
Under the 1909 Act, Legg Mason's exposure for statutory damages
would have been considerably less than this award, and the actual
damages in the case were probably about $60,000.109
Awards of this sort are inconsistent with the tripartite structure
for statutory damages that Congress established in 1976. In addi-
tion, as we explain in the next Part, Legg Mason was correct in
asserting that due process principles of the Supreme Court's
punitive damages jurisprudence do and should limit grossly
excessive statutory damage awards in copyright cases."0
101. Id. at *5-21.
102. Id. at *13, *19-21.
103. Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455 (D. Md. 2004).
104. Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 737, 742-44 (D. Md. 2003).
105. Legg Mason, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 458 & n.2.
106. See id. at 457, 458 & n.2.
107. Legg Mason's defense was essentially: "We are subscribers, we were using the copies
for research purposes, and we thought this was fair use." See id. at 461-62.
108. Although the Second Circuit had ruled against a similar fair use defense in American
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, that case was decided by a 2-1 majority. See 60 F.3d 913, 932
(2d Cir. 1994) (Jacobs, J., dissenting). Lowry's brought its case in a different circuit, and Legg
Mason may have thought that courts in a different circuit would view its fair use defense
more charitably.
109. Evanson, supra note 21, at 632 n.203.
110. Legg Mason, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 459-60 (discussing the due process challenge to this
award).
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II. STATUTORY DAMAGES AWARDS IN COPYRIGHT CASES SHOULD
BE CONSISTENT WITH DUE PROCESS PRINCIPLES
Part I has shown that copyright statutory damages are some-
times punitive in both effect and intent. Section A of this Part
reviews the Supreme Court's jurisprudence concerning due process
limits on grossly excessive punitive damage awards. Section B
demonstrates that some statutory damage awards in copyright
cases comport with Congress's intent to establish a just statutory
damage regime and with due process principles. Section C dis-
cusses some statutory damage awards that are inconsistent with
Congress's goal of establishing a just statutory damage regime and
with BMWof North America, Inc. v. Gore' and its progeny. Section
D argues that the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence does
apply to statutory damage awards in copyright cases.
A. The Supreme Court's Due Process Jurisprudence Limits
Punitive Damage Awards
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore is the foundational ruling of
the U.S. Supreme Court's modern due process jurisprudence on
punitive damages." 2 Gore sued BMW for fraud, claiming that the
firm's failure to disclose that his "new" car had, in fact, been re-
painted was deceitful and materially harmed him."' In addition to
obtaining a jury award of $4,000 in actual damages, 1 4 Gore sought
and obtained a $4 million punitive damage award by arguing that
BMW should be punished for hiding the repairs made to "new" cars
from roughly a thousand other customers." 5 Although the Alabama
Supreme Court upheld the liability ruling, it reduced the punitive
award to $2 million."' The U.S. Supreme Court reviewed this
111. 517 U.S. 559 (1999).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 563-64.
114. Id. at 565.
115. Id. at 564-65.
116. Id. at 566-67. The Alabama court lowered the punitive award because the award was
based in part on harm to consumers beyond Alabama borders. Id. at 567. The U.S. Supreme
Court pointed out that BMW's failure to disclose repairs such as repainting did not violate
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award and ruled that "grossly excessive" punitive damage awards,
such as the $2 million award against BMW, violate the Due Process
clause of the U.S. Constitution."'
Gore set forth three criteria, often referred to as "the Gore
guideposts,""' 8 for determining whether a punitive damage award
is consistent with due process: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of
the defendant's actions, (2) the disparity between the harm to the
plaintiff and the punitive award, and (3) the similarity or difference
between the punitive award and civil penalties authorized or
imposed in comparable situations." 9
Gore characterized the reprehensibility criterion as "[p]erhaps
the most important indicium" for determining whether a punitive
award is reasonable or excessive. 2 ° The Court recognized that
"some wrongs are more blameworthy than others,""' and proffered
several factors for judging relative reprehensibility, including
whether: the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the
tortious conduct evinced an "indifference to or reckless disregard for
the health and safety of others"; the target of the conduct had
financial vulnerability; the harm "was part of a pattern rather than
an isolated incident"; and the harm was the result of intentional
malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.'22
Because the harm in Gore was economic and because the firm
had not made deliberately false statements and could reasonably
have thought it did not need to mention minor repairs, the Court
placed BMW at the less reprehensible end of this spectrum.1 23 The
Court observed "[t]hat conduct is sufficiently reprehensible to
give rise to tort liability, and even a modest award of exemplary
the laws of many states. Id. at 569-71.
117. Id. at 562-63 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454
(1993)).
118. Id. at 574. The Court characterized these criteria as "guideposts," and commentators
have followed suit. See, e.g., Evanson, supra note 21, at 605-13.
119. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574-75.
120. Id. at 575.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 576,608. The Court also noted that"a recidivist maybe punished more severely
than a first offender." Id. at 577.
123. Id. at 580.
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damages does not establish the high degree of culpability that
warrants a substantial punitive damages award.' 2 a
The reasonableness of a punitive award depends not only on the
relative reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct but also on the
proportionality between the compensatory and punitive awards.
Judging the reasonableness of punitive awards in relation to
compensatory awards has "a long pedigree."'125 Pre-republic English
laws allowed punitive awards between two and four times actual
damages, and the Court opined that the relevant maximum ratio
was generally 10:1.126 Somewhat higher ratio awards might be
justified when actual damages arising from highly egregious con-
duct were quite small, and lower ratios should be considered when
conduct was less reprehensible or the compensatory award more
substantial. 127 Although constitutional due process assessments
of punitive awards could not, of course, be reduced to "a simple
mathematical formula," the Court considered the 500:1 ratio in
Gore to be "breathtaking" and unwarranted, especially given the
low level of BMW's reprehensibility. 28
One consideration underlying the third guidepost--comparable
civil sanctions for the same or similar conduct-is that "[e]lemen-
tary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurispru-
dence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the
conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity
of the penalty that a State may impose."'29 The Court observed that
Alabama had set the maximum civil penalty for comparable wrongs
at $2,000.13° A reasonable BMW executive might have believed that
the firm's exposure to civil liability in Alabama was in that range,
not a thousand times larger. The Court also considered whether a
more modest award would adequately deter this defendant.' 3 ' The
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 580-81.
127. Id. at 582.
128. Id. at 582-83.
129. Id. at 574.
130. Id. at 584.
131. Id. "In the absence ofa history of noncompliance with known statutory requirements,
there is no basis for assuming that a more modest sanction would not have been sufficient
to motivate full compliance." Id. at 584-85.
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Court could not accept the conclusion that "BMW's conduct was
sufficiently egregious to justify a punitive sanction that is tanta-
mount to a severe criminal penalty." '132 Justice Breyer's concurrence
pointed to the "substantial risk" of arbitrary outcomes because
juries are insufficiently constrained by due process principles.'33
The Court reaffirmed and extended Gore in Cooper Industries,
Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.'34 In Cooper Industries, the
Court ruled that judges should apply a de novo standard of review
in determining whether a punitive damage award is consistent with
constitutional due process principles.'35 Leatherman sued Cooper
for trademark infringement and unfair competition because Cooper
copied the configuration and features of Leatherman's multi-
purpose tool and advertised the tool with a photograph of a slightly
modified Leatherman tool.'36 The jury awarded $50,000 in compen-
satory damages and $4.5 million in punitive damages. 137 Both the
trial and appellate courts ruled that the punitive damage award
was not "grossly excessive" under Gore,3 although the appellate
court vacated the injunction against Cooper's manufacture of a
132. Id. at 585. As Evanson has noted, "[slince punitive damages act in a quasi-criminal
manner, 'straddling' civil and criminal penalties, they run the risk of imposing what amount
to criminal penalties without the increased safeguards that criminal law offers." Evanson,
supra note 21, at 603-04 (citation omitted).
133. Gore, 517 U.S. at 595-96 (Breyer, J., concurring).
To the extent that neither clear legal principles nor fairly obvious historical or
community-based standards (defining, say, especially egregious behavior)
significantly constrain punitive damage awards, is there not a substantial risk
of outcomes so arbitrary that they become difficult to square with the
Constitution's assurance, to every citizen, of the law's protection?
Id. at 596.
134. 532 U.S. 424 (2001). Cooper Industries is a significant case for our analysis, not only
because of its holding on de novo review of jury awards for gross excessiveness, but also
because it involved claims of infringement of an intellectual property right and wrongful
copying by the defendant as well as an excessive award by a jury.
135. Id. at 443. The Court opined that "the level of punitive damages is not really a 'fact'
'tried' by the jury." Id. at 437 (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for the Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S.
415, 459 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). The Court rejected an argument derived from
Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell that "punitive damages should equal the harm
multiplied by ... the ratio of the injurer's chance of escaping liability to his chance of being
held liable." Id. at 439 (citing Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An
Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REv. 869, 890-91 (1998)).
136. Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 427-28.
137. Id. at 426.
138. Id. at 429-30.
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similar tool on the ground that the tool's configuration was too
functional to be protectable as a trademark. 3
9
An important consideration in Cooper Industries was the insti-
tutional competence of juries versus judges in applying the Gore
guideposts.140 Juries and trial judges may have greater institutional
competence than appellate courts in judging the reprehensibility of
the defendant's conduct, but trial and appellate courts have equal
competence-and greater competence than juries-in assessing
the reasonableness of the proportionality of punishment to harm.
Appellate courts, however, are the most competent judges of the
comparable sanction guidepost. 4' Although saying it did not intend
to prejudge how the Gore guideposts should be applied in Cooper
Industries, the Court remanded for de novo review while hinting
that Cooper's conduct was not very reprehensible, the harm to
punitive damage ratio was very high, the jury might have based the
punitive award on unrealistic assumptions, and the fine for unfair
trade practices in Oregon could not have exceeded $25,000. 142
Still other decisions have struck down as "grossly excessive" high
punitive damage awards that plaintiffs sought to justify because
the wrongs done to them were part of a pattern of bad acts. In State
Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell, for example, the
Court reversed a $145 million punitive damage award against
State Farm as unconstitutionally excessive, 143 despite the Court's
acceptance of the jury's finding of liability for State Farm's wrongful
failure to settle a tort lawsuit, and the $1 million compensatory
award.1 44 The Campbells' lawyer argued that the high punitive
damage award was justified because State Farm had adopted a
nationwide policy of limiting payouts to insurance customers in
139. Id. The courts below thought the punitive award "was proportional and fair, given the
nature of the conduct, the evidence of intentional passing off, and the size of an award
necessary to create deterrence to an entity of Cooper's size." Id. at 430 (quoting Leatherman
Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 205 F.3d 1351 (9th Cir. 1999)).
140. See id. at 440.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 442-43.
143. 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003).
144. Id. at 419-20. The jury actually awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in compensatory
damages, but the trial court reduced the compensatory award to $1 million. Id. at 415.
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order to meet internal fiscal goals, and the Campbells were one of
many claimants harmed by this policy.
The Utah Supreme Court upheld the punitive award for several
reasons. First, it regarded State Farm's policy as quite reprehen-
sible. 14 Second, State Farm had enjoyed "massive wealth" in part
because of this policy.'46 Third, the Campbells had offered testimony
that the clandestine nature of the policy suggested that State Farm
would rarely be caught and punished for its bad acts, and thus that
severe punishment was warranted when the company did get
caught.147 And finally, State Farm could have been fined $10,000
per fraud and forced to disgorge its profits if the state had sued it
for these wrongs, making the sanction relatively comparable to
other civil awards.
148
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with the Utah court on every
point. Although the Court noted that State Farm's policy "merits no
praise,"149 the Campbells had offered "scant evidence" that State
Farm had injured others in the same way it had injured them. 5 °
Much of the evidence presented at trial consisted of tangential and
inflammatory testimony about State Farm's nationwide operations
and claim adjustment policies.' 5 ' The Court noted that "[t]he rep-
rehensibility guidepost does not permit courts to expand the scope
of the case so that a defendant may be punished for any malfea-
sance."'52 Utah did not have a legitimate interest in punishing State
Farm for harms suffered beyond its borders, for harms unrelated to
those experienced by the Campbells, or for harms that were lawful,
even if unsavory, in jurisdictions in which they occurred.'53 "Due
process does not permit courts, in the calculation of punitive
damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties' hypothetical
claims against a defendant under the guise of the reprehensibility
145. Campbell v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1153 (Utah 2001).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1154-55.
149. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419.
150. Id. at 423.
151. Id. at 420, 423-24.
152. Id. at 424.
153. Id. at 422-24.
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analysis." 54 The Court recognized that there was a risk of "multiple
punitive damage awards for the same conduct" if it upheld the
punitive award in State Farm.'55
As for the reasonableness of the punitive award in relation to
actual harm, the Court opined that "sanctions of double, treble, or
quadruple [actual] damages [will generally be adequate] to deter
and punish," and "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio ... will
satisfy due process."'56 Accordingly, a 145:1 ratio should be pre-
sumed "grossly excessive."' 7 This presumption was not overcome
in State Farm in part because the compensatory award was already
substantial and fully compensated the Campbells for the suffering
they had experienced.' The Utah court's concern about difficulty
of detecting harms resulting from State Farm's policy as a rationale
for the large punitive award was off-base because it "had little to do
with the actual harm sustained by the Campbells."'59 State Farm's
wealth also should have been given little weight, as heavy reli-
ance on this factor creates the risk of arbitrary and biased jury
awards.' The Court was also skeptical of the Utah court's com-
parable sanction analysis.' The punitive award being "neither
reasonable nor proportionate to the wrong committed," the Court
ruled that "it was an irrational and arbitrary deprivation of [State
Farm's] property."''
154. Id. at 423.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 425.
157. Id. at 426.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 427.
160. Id. at 427-28.
161. Id. at 428.
162. Id. at 429. Further reinforcing State Farm's reluctance to allow plaintiffs to obtain
very high ratio punitive awards from defendants whose actions have injured others is Philip
Morris USA v. Williams, in which the Court ruled that a punitive award based in part on a
desire to punish the defendant for harming persons not before the Court (in this case, other
smokers) is an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of law. 549 U.S.
346, 349 (2007). The Court thought it was fine for juries to consider risks that the defendant's
conduct posed to others as part of the reprehensibility assessment, but juries should not go
the next step and punish this defendant for the harm caused to others. Id. at 1063-64. "Mo
permit punishment for injuring a nonparty victim would add a nearly standardless
dimension to the punitive damages equation." Id. at 1063. Not only would defendants be
denied the opportunity to defend themselves against these other claims, but there would be
a risk of '"arbitrary punishments' ... that reflect not 'an application of law, but a
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The relevance of the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence
for statutory damage awards in copyright cases has been recognized
by a number of courts and commentators, 163 although, as Part III.D
will show, there is not unanimity on its applicability.
16 4
decisionmaker's caprice."' Id. at 1062 (quoting State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416, 418).
A possible corollary principle to Philip Morris is that a punitive award should be calibrated
only to deter the defendant before the court from engaging in similar wrongful acts--the
punitive award may speak for itself as a deterrent to others, but punitive damages awarded
expressly to deter others violate the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence. See Thomas
C. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, Present, and Future
of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 463 (2008) ("[lPublic deterrence is an unavoidable
(albeit perfectly desirable) result of punitive damages as punishment for private wrongs, but
it is not and cannot be the driving force behind them.'); Audio Recording: Thomas Colby,
Statutory Damages and the Tenenbaum Litigation, Intellectual Property Colloquium at
45:55-47:47 (Feb. 2009), http://www.ipcolloquium.comIPrograms/5.html. Note that the force
of Philip Morris as a precedent has been lessened somewhat by the Court's unwillingness to
hear the tobacco company's appeal of the Oregon court's refusal to lower the punitive award
on remand. Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 129 S. Ct. 1436 (2009) (mem.). In UMG v.
MP3.com, the court veered into this dangerous territory of "general deterrence," and despite
noting that such an issue "must always be approached with caution," the court handed down
a multimillion dollar statutory damage award aimed expressly at deterring "[other]
companies operating in the area of the Internet." No. 00 Civ. 472 (JSR), 2000 WL 1262568,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000). Yet, the Supreme Court continues to take due process review
of high punitive damage awards very seriously. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128
S. Ct. 2605, 2632-34 (2008) (striking down as grossly excessive a punitive award for conduct
resulting in the Exxon Valdez oil spill because it exceeded the norm in maritime cases).
163. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publ'g, 507 F.3d 470, 486-90 (6th
Cir. 2007) (striking down high ratio punitive damage award in common law copyright case
as inconsistent with Gore, et al.), remanded to Westbound Records, Inc. v. Justin Combs
Publ'g, Inc., No. 3.05-0155, 2009 WL 943516, at *2-3 (N.D. Tenn. Apr. 3, 2009) (finding
defendant's conduct reprehensible enough to justify a 2:1 ratio); Video Views, Inc. v. Studio
21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1017 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[Cloncerns of due process and the opportunity
for meaningful, if limited, appellate review contemplate that the district court would provide
some explanation of the factual findings that underlie this exercise of discretion to award
greater than minimum statutory damages.'); Atl. Recording Corp. v. Brennan, 534 F. Supp.
2d 278, 282 (D. Conn. 2008) (denying motion for default judgment in p2p case because
defendant might have viable defense as to unconstitutionality of statutory damage award);
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Lindor, No. CV-05-1095 (DGT), 2006 WL 3335048, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.
2006) (granting motion for leave to amend answer to plead unconstitutionality of statutory
damage award in p2p filesharing case because due process defense is not frivolous); In re
Napster, Inc., No. C MDL-00-1369 MHP, 2005 WL 1287611, at *10 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2005)
(giving credence to due process concerns about grossly excessive statutory damage awards
in copyright cases); see also PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 9, § 22:181, at 22-433
to 22-435, § 22:208, at 22-473 to 22-476; Barker, supra note 14, at 542-48; Berg, supra note
17, at 308; Evanson, supra note 21, at 635-37.
164. See Zomba Enters. Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 586-88 (6th Cir.
2007) (rejecting due process challenge to copyright statutory damage award); Lowry's
Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455, 459-60 (D. Md. 2004) (same).
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Applying the Gore guideposts to copyright statutory damages is
relatively straightforward. Although the harm in copyright cases
will always be economic, the relative reprehensibility of copyright
infringers depends on a number of factors, such as: the extent to
which infringers are intentional bad actors (for example, counter-
feiters) who were commercially exploiting the plaintiffs works or
were merely careless about whether they might be infringing;
whether a reasonable person in the defendant's shoes could have
believed that her actions were lawful; whether a noninfringement
defense was plausible; whether the case involved a novel issue of
law; the relatively large or small scale of the infringement; whether
the infringement was part of a pattern of similar misconduct or an
isolated event; whether the defendant was a recidivist or first
offender; and whether the defendant impeded efforts to determine
liability or damages." 5
Application of the reasonable ratio guidepost is also relatively
straightforward. Statutory damages are, of course, not inherently
punitive and usually serve compensatory and modestly deterrent
functions when awarded against innocent or ordinary infringers.
Statutory damage awards only become punitive when they are
imposed on willful infringers and represent high multiples over
actual damages or the defendant's profits.'66 As in Gore, the rea-
sonableness of the ratio should depend both on the relative
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct as well as on the relative
size of the compensatory award.'67 Multiples over actual damages
should be lower when compensatory awards are very large but may
be higher when the compensatory award is smaller.' When a
statutory damage award is in or above the six- or seven-figure
range, it likely has a punitive component. It is common for courts
to consider what actual damages the plaintiff suffered or what
profits were attributable to infringement in setting statutory
damage awards, and therefore it is generally easy to discern the
165. Most of these factors parallel those considered in Gore. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576-80 (1996).
166. See supra Part I; see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 14.04[E] [1] [a], at 14-93-
96 (endorsing the view that statutory damages ought to have some correlation with actual
damages).
167. Gore, 517 U.S. at 580-83.
168. See id. at 582.
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compensatory to punitive ratio. Even in cases in which courts do not
mention damages or profits, it is generally possible to approximate
the relative magnitude of damages or profits and thus to discern
approximately what part of a statutory damage award is compensa-
tory and what part is punitive. Any statutory damage award that
is well over the 10:1 ratio articulated as a general outer limit by
Gore and State Farm should be scrutinized with some care.
The comparable civil sanction guidepost is somewhat trickier to
apply, as there are no separate civil fines, as such, for copyright
infringement. One hardly can compare the statutory damage regime
to itself.169 We think that the principal goal of this guidepost is to
provide courts with a way of assessing how careful the legislature
was in calibrating the specific sanction in question in relation to the
specific conduct it was trying to prevent; how much deference
should be given to the legislative judgment depends on the level of
care it actually exercised."' ° In Part II.D, we will explain why we
think the statutory damage regime in U.S. copyright law lacks the
careful calibration that would justify substantial deference to the
legislature.'71
169. See, e.g., Barker, supra note 14, at 544 (concluding that the third guidepost provides
no useful insights in copyright cases). Evanson suggests that courts could assess the third
guidepost in copyright statutory damage cases by comparing the award made in a particular
case with statutory damage awards in other copyright cases. Evanson, supra note 21, at 632-
35.
170. Evanson argues that the extent of careful legislative calibration (or lack thereof) is
the key consideration in assessing the third guidepost. Evanson, supra note 21, at 629-37.
Gore makes clear that courts should give some deference to legislatively set sanctions, but
also that such sanctions are subject to due process review. Gore, 517 U.S. at 572, 584. We
think it is pertinent to the comparable sanctions analysis that Congress made some effort
to construct a statutory damage regime so that awards would not be excessive. See supra
Part I.B.
171. The comparable sanction analysis in the copyright context also might focus usefully
on the level of award that a late registering copyright owner could have gotten for the same
infringement (for example, actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and any profits the
defendant made that are attributable to the infringement). See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006). It
is worth noting that other intellectual property regimes significantly limit punitive awards
by authorizing no more than a doubling or at most a tripling of damage awards for willful
infringements. U.S. trade secrecy law, for instance, allows a doubling of damage awards for
"willful and malicious" trade secrecy violations. See U.S.T.A. § 3(b) (1985), available at
http://nsi.org/Library/Espionage/usta.htm. U.S. patent and trademark laws allow courts to
award up to three times actual damages when infringements are willful, see 15 U.S.C. §
1117(a) (2006), although trademark counterfeiters may face stiffer damages under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1117(c); 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). It also is pertinent to the comparable sanctions analysis
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B. Some Copyright Statutory Damage Awards Are Consistent
with Congress's Intent and Due Process Principles
Statutory damages are sometimes awarded in a manner that is
consistent with the tripartite structure of § 504(c) and with due
process principles. Some awards have been quite moderate in close
cases, others approximate actual damages, and still others are
enhanced by modest amounts (for example, two or three times
actual damages) in somewhat egregious cases, and more (for
example, eight to ten times actual damages) in more egregious
infringement cases.
When courts perceive that defendants believed in good faith
that their uses of copyrighted materials were fair or otherwise
noninfringing, they sometimes award only minimum statutory
damages. For example, in Infinity Broadcasting Corp. v. Kirkwood,
the defendant transmitted broadcast radio over telephone lines to
enable customers to monitor the ads for which they had paid."7 2
Although the court ultimately rejected Kirkwood's fair use defense,
it awarded only minimum statutory damages because the fair use
claim was plausible and there appeared to be no real damage to the
plaintiff.17
Although one might have expected at least some putative fair
users to be treated as innocent infringers, we found no fair use case
in which the court regarded the putative fair user as an innocent
infringer. Indeed, we were only able to find two cases in which a
court ever awarded statutory damages in an amount lower than the
that statutory damages are a rarity in national copyright laws. Most developed nations do
not allow courts or juries to award pre-established damages within a range or even enhanced
damages for willful infringement. Those nations that do have statutory damage provisions
provide more guidance than U.S. law does about factors to consider in making awards within
a statutory range. See Wheatland, supra note 1.
172. Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 63 F. Supp. 2d 420, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
173. Id. at 427-28; see also MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 187 (2d Cir. 1981) (lowering
$32,500 statutory damage award for bawdy song to $250 in a close fair use case); Warner
Bros. Entm't v. RDR Books, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 545, 553-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (awarding
minimum statutory damages against defendants who had good faith beliefs that they had
only made fair use of the plaintiffs' works); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, No. 95-1107-A,
1996 WL 633131, at *15 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 1996) (awarding minimum statutory damages for
infringement of Scientology texts posted on the Internet where fair use defense was
plausible).
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ordinary infringement minimum. 17 4 In one of these cases, Warner
Bros., Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc., the court imposed $100 in stat-
utory damages against the Korean owners of a small shop that was
selling toys that, unbeknownst to them, infringed copyrights in
fanciful characters from a popular movie.'75 The low award in Dae
Rim was probably also due to the court's outrage at the "unfair,
vexatious, and oppressive manner" in which Warner's lawyers had
litigated the case, which had been unnecessarily prolonged to rack
up large attorney's fees and statutory damages.'76
Courts have also sometimes awarded minimum statutory
damages when the infringement caused only minimal, if any, harm
to the plaintiff and yielded little, if any, profits to the defendant. In
Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., for instance, the court
ordered a minimum statutory damage award against a newspaper
that reproduced without permission an article written by a Harvard
law student who initially had published it in a school newspaper.'77
The court considered the fair market value of the article and the
costs the paper saved by using the student's article rather than
rewriting the story and concluded that the $250 award adequately
compensated the plaintiff and deterred the defendant. 7 ' And in
174. Courts have been very stringent about the burden of proof that defendants bear when
they claim "innocent" infringement. They must show not only that they had a good faith
belief that their conduct was noninfringing but also that they had a reasonable basis for this
belief. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 14.04[B] [2] [a]. But even this may not lead to
a reduction to $200 in statutory damages, as the reduction is discretionary with the court.
Id. For a thorough historical analysis of innocent infringement in copyright law, see, for
example, Reese, supra note 57, at 183-84 (expressing concern that current law may be
deterring many uses of copyrighted works that would ultimately be determined to be lawful
because it is so harsh on innocent infringers).
175. 677 F. Supp. 740, 769-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). The second such case was D.C. Comics, Inc.
v. Mini Gift Shop, 912 F.2d 29, 35-36 (2d Cir. 1990), where the court upheld a $200 award as
to a defendant that lacked business sophistication and notice that the infringed works were
copyrighted.
176. Dae Rim, 677 F. Supp. at 745 ("Warner has been pressing this litigation for over three
years for the purpose of collecting disproportionately large statutory damages and attorney's
fees."); see also Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 144, 146-47
(D.D.C. 1986) (expressing concern about the aggressiveness of the plaintiff's lawyer and the
plaintiffs baseless claims).
177. 511 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1981); see also Blyv. Banbury Books, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 983,
988 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (awarding $250 minimum for unauthorized use of software when
plaintiffs damages were nominal); Reader's Digest, 642 F. Supp. at 147 (awarding minimum
statutory damages when harm to plaintiff was minimal).
178. Quinto, 511 F. Supp. at 582.
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Doehrer v. Caldwell, a political cartoonist received a minimum
award against a politician whose campaign reproduced a cartoon in
its campaign literature.'79 The court rejected the plaintiffs argu-
ment for maximum statutory damages because Caldwell had used
the cartoon in fund-raising pamphlets, and the only harm in the
case was to plaintiffs reputation "by [an] unwanted association
with a candidate he did not support."' ° The court pointed out that
"[a] mechanical application of the statutory damage provision of
the Copyright Act leads to absurd results," adding that "its de-
terrent provisions should not be converted into a windfall where, as
a practical matter, the plaintiff has suffered only nominal dam-
ages.''
In other ordinary infringement cases, courts have awarded
statutory damages in amounts that approximated actual damages
and/or defendants' profits. In Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v.
Publications International, Ltd., for instance, the publisher of books
that summarized plots of a popular television series was found to
have willfully infringed; yet the plaintiff was awarded statutory
damages roughly equivalent to the actual damages it alleged it had
suffered." 2 Courts have also deferred to an advance agreement
between the parties about an appropriate statutory damage award
in the event that the court did not find the defendant's legal argu-
ment compelling.'83
Other statutory damage awards have involved relatively modest
multiples over actual damages in cases finding willful infringement.
In Fallaci v. New Gazette Literary Corp., for example, the defendant
was held to be a willful infringer for its unauthorized translation of
a prominent writer's interview with the Polish prime minister into
the Russian language, but the court decided that an award of twice
179. 207 U.S.P.Q. 391, 393 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993) (affirming a $120,000 statutory damage award where
plaintiff alleged $125,000 in actual damages); see also New Line Cinema Corp. v. Russ Berrie
& Co., 161 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("New Line's statutory damages should be
commensurate with the actual damages incurred.').
183. Encyc. Brittanica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 558 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1983)
(awarding agreed upon statutory damages for unauthorized recordings of educational
television programs).
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the author's normal translation fee was adequate as statutory
damages. 1"
In more egregious willful infringement cases, somewhat higher
multiples over actual damages and profits have been awarded, and
some of these are consistent with due process principles. In
Lauratex Textile Corp. v. Allton Knitting Mills, for instance, the
court awarded statutory damages that were roughly eight times the
actual damages that the plaintiff had suffered from the defendant's
infringement, in part because the defendant was a repeat in-
fringer.185 The $40,000 award was thought necessary to deter
further infringements. The court did not, however, award the
enhanced maximum possible statutory damage for this willful
infringement."18
Even highly willful and egregious infringers do not always suffer
the maximum statutory penalty for their sins. In United States
Media Corp. v. Edde Entertainment Corp., the main defendant was
a large-scale bootlegger of pornographic films."8 ' Edde's firm made
a practice of searching the Copyright Office registration records
before bootlegging particular films, apparently calculating that
fellow pornographers who did not qualify for statutory damages and
184. 568 F. Supp. 1172, 1173-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Fallaci argued for maximum statutory
damages because of harm to her reputation arising from flaws in the translation and its
appearance in a nonprestigious forum. Id. at 1174. The court did not mention whether this
concern played any role in the statutory damage award. Other examples of modest multiples
over actual damages include Hi-Tech Video Products, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 804
F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Mich. 1992), where the court awarded three times the ordinary license
fee for infringement of portions of Good Morning America program, and U.S. Songs, Inc. v.
Downside Lenox, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Ga. 1991), where the court awarded
approximately three times the license fee to which the plaintiff was entitled. Courts
sometimes also segment statutory damage awards so they conform to time periods of relative
greater and lesser culpability. See, e.g., Nat'l Football League v. PrimeTime 24 Joint
Venture, 131 F. Supp. 2d 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (awarding lower statutory damages in an
initial period because defendant might have reasonably believed its acts were noninfringing,
but higher awards for continuing acts of infringement after lower court ruling against its
defense).
185. 519 F. Supp. 730, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Recall that Gore pointed out that "a recidivist
may be punished more severely than a first offender." BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559, 577 (1996).
186. Lauratex, 519 F. Supp. at 732-33.
187. No. 94 Civ. 4849 (MBM) MHD, 1998 WL 401532 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1998); see also
Pret-A-Printee, Ltd. v. Allton Knitting Mills, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 150, 153-54 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (awarding $30,000 against repeat infringer, but not $50,000 maximum).
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attorney's fees would not find it worthwhile to sue him.18 Edde
even put copyright notices and FBI warnings on the packaging for
his bootleg goods.'8 9 But as it turned out, at least one of the films
Edde bootlegged did qualify for a statutory damage award. The
judge carefully calculated the actual damages and profits as to Edde
and the retailers who sold his goods and decided to award $50,000
in statutory damages as to Edde for that film, along with $112,760
in damages and profits for infringement of the other four films. 9 0
This statutory damage award was roughly twice the actual profits
as to the registered film and half of the maximum possible award.'9 '
Even more reprehensible than Edde were the sound recording
counterfeiters in RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, against whom the court
awarded the then-maximum of $50,000 in statutory damages for
each of the twenty-seven sound recordings infringed, for a total
award of $1.45 million.'92 Peri, the lead defendant, had already
pleaded guilty to two counts of criminal copyright infringement by
the time the civil trial occurred.'93 The scale of the defendants'
counterfeiting operations was vast: roughly 90 percent of the 1.8
million records they manufactured and sold were counterfeit
goods. 9 4 Peri ran the counterfeit operation for years and generated
considerable profits from the enterprise, although neither Peri nor
his fellow defendants provided enough documentation about the
infringing records at issue to calculate the firm's profits precisely. 195
Based on the incomplete information at hand, the court could only
identify $42,239 in damages and profits, but this probably vastly
understated the actual damages and profits attributable to this
infringement. 196 Even though the ratio of proven damages to the
statutory award is much higher than Gore and its progeny suggest
188. U.S. Media, 1998 WL 401532, at *18-19.
189. Id.
190. Id. at *1, *9-11, *19-21.
191. Id. at *17-21; see also Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Fanzine Intl, Inc., 98 Civ. 7448 (RCC),
2001 WL 930248 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2001) (awarding $500,000 statutory damage award for
willful infringement of cartoon characters against recidivist infringer because this was
necessary to deter it as well as other potential infringers).
192. 596 F. Supp. 849, 861, 863-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
193. Id. at 854.
194. Id. at 859.
195. Id. at 858-62.
196. Id. at 861.
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is the upper limit, Peri may be the sort of case in which, because of
the reprehensibility of the defendants' conduct and their efforts
to thwart a precise accounting of profits, a higher ratio statutory
damage award was consistent with due process principles.
Also consistent with congressional intent and with the Supreme
Court's due process jurisprudence are cases that take into account
the deterrent effect of attorney's fee awards as a reason to limit the
extent of a statutory damage award. In Arclightz & Films Pvt. Ltd.
v. Video Palace, Inc., for example, the court awarded a filmmaker
more than $20,000 in attorney's fees but only the minimum of $750
in statutory damages for a video store's making of DVD and VHS
format copies of Arclightz's movie and selling or renting them to
customers.'97 Although persuaded that the infringement was will-
ful, the court regarded the defendant's admission of liability and
willingness to settle the case as mitigating factors; Video Palace
was, moreover, a small business such that the minimum statutory
damage award would give the plaintiff more than the defendant's
profits, and the attorney's fee award would deter further infringe-
ment.
198
Occasionally courts make an effort to be consistent with stat-
utory damage awards in similar cases.' 99 For example, in Sega
Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA, an online bulletin board service was
operating a site which encouraged its paying customers to upload
and download commercially valuable video games including those
made by Sega.2 °° The court held that MAPHIA was a willful in-
fringer because it not only encouraged this uploading and down-
loading, but was being paid for this service and sold copiers for
197. 303 F. Supp. 2d 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
198. Id. at 363.
199. Courts generally have made some effort to award statutory damages in a roughly
consistent manner in cases involving unlicensed public performances of music in taverns or
similar venues. See, e.g., Blendingwell Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 474 (D.
Del. 1985) (awarding $500 per infringing performance at saloon); Milene Music, Inc. v.
Gotauco, 551 F. Supp. 1288, 1296-97 (D.R.I. 1982) (awarding $625 per infringing performance
of music in a tavern); George Simon, Inc. v. Spatz, 492 F. Supp. 836 (W.D. Wis. 1980)
(awarding $500 per infringing performance of music in a tavern); see also Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Lyndon Lanes, Inc., 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 731, 733 (W.D. Ky. 1985) (awarding statutory
damages of $250 per work for unlicensed public performance of music on a jukebox in a
bowling alley).
200. 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
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these games." 1 Noting that the Ninth Circuit had upheld an award
of $5,000 per infringed work in a similar case, the court in MA4PH!A
decided that a similar award was justified in the case before it. 202
C. Some Copyright Statutory Damage Awards Are Inconsistent
with Congressional Intent and Due Process Principles
The Thomas, °3 MP3.com, 24 and Free Republic205 cases discussed
earlier are examples of cases in which copyright statutory damage
awards have been grossly excessive and inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence. °6 In all three cases,
reprehensibility was low because evidence of willfulness was weak,
none of the defendants were the kind of egregious or repeat
infringer for which the enhanced statutory damage awards were
intended,20 7 and the ratio of punitive to actual damages was
exceptionally high.208 We believe that they are also inconsistent
with the tripartite structure that Congress established for statutory
damages in 1976. This section gives numerous other examples of
cases in which statutory damage awards have been punitive and
difficult to square with Congress's intent in establishing a just
statutory damage regime and with due process principles.
201. Id. at 936.
202. Id. at 940 (citing Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Dragon Pac. Int'l, 40 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th
Cir. 1994)); see also Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Sabella, No. C 93-04260 CW, 1996 WL 780560 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 18, 1996) (making same award on same facts). The award in MAPH!A was only
$10,000 for infringement of two of Sega's games, rather than the $200,000 that the statute
would have permitted for willful infringement in this case. MAPH!A, 948 F. Supp. at 940; see
also Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Ketchum, 830 F. Supp. 1443, 1445 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (awarding
statutory damages of $2,000 per infringed work for selling counterfeit videogames).
203. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008).
204. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
205. L.A. Times, Inc. v. Free Republic, No. 98-7840 MMM AJWX, 2000 WL 1863566 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 16, 2000).
206. See supra Part I.B.2.
207. As we pointed out in Part I.B, Congress expected enhanced statutory damages to be
used only in "exceptional cases," by which we think it meant egregious infringement cases,
such as those involving counterfeiting or recidivist infringements. Those who should perhaps
have known they were infringing or even knew they were engaged in risky behavior should
be treated as ordinary infringers.
208. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
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One unfortunate practice utilized in several recent cases has
been to jump straight to the statutory maximum, even when the
infringement caused little or no actual harm to the plaintiff and
brought the defendant little or no profit. In Macklin v. Mueck, for
example, the plaintiff sued two individuals who operated poetry
websites for infringing copyrights in two of Macklin's poems by
posting them online.2" 9 After the defendants defaulted by not
answering the complaint, Macklin moved for an award of maximum
statutory damages based on his bare allegation that the infringe-
ments were willful.21 ° Seeming to recognize the unlikelihood that
the defendants had profited from the infringements and the
likelihood that actual damages were almost certainly modest, the
magistrate recommended an award of the ordinary infringement
minimum of $750 per poem to compensate the plaintiff and deter
the defendants.211 Yet, the trial judge accepted Macklin's allegation
that the infringement was willful and awarded $300,000, the
maximum possible award.212 This award was plainly punitive, far
in excess of what was needed to compensate the plaintiff and deter
further infringement.21
209. Macklin v. Mueck, No. 00-14092-CIV-MOORE/LYNCH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28416
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2004). Interestingly, at the time of the infringements and throughout the
litigation, Macklin was incarcerated in a Florida correctional institution, having been
convicted on numerous counts of armed robbery and sentenced to serve multiple life
sentences. Id. at *1; see also Macklin v. Singletary, 24 F.3d 1307, 1308-09 (11th Cir. 1994).
210. Macklin v. Mueck, No. 00-14092-CIV MOORE, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18026, at *3
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2005).
211. Macklin, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28416, at *5-6; see also Axact (Pvt), Ltd. v. Student
Network Res., Inc., No. 07-5491 (FLW), 2008 WL 4754907 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2008) (awarding
$300,000, the maximum statutory damages, on a default judgment against the off-shore
operator of a website containing academic research papers that both parties were selling to
their customers); Design Tex Group, Inc. v. U.S. Vinyl Mfg. Corp., 04 Civ. 5002 (JSR), 2005
WL 2063819 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2005) (awarding $150,000 for infringement when actual
damages were $3,389); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Talisman Commc'ns, Inc., No. CV99-10450 RAP
MCX, 2000 WL 364813 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27,2000) (awarding $300,000 as maximum statutory
damages on default judgment for unlicensed posting of sexualized photographs on the
defendant's website). One court has opined that it is appropriate to award statutory damages
in default judgment cases insofar as proof of damages or profits is within the defendant's
control. See Microsoft Corp. v. McGee, 490 F. Supp. 2d 874, 882 (N.D. Ohio 2007). Of course,
this cannot be done when plaintiffs have not promptly registered with the Copyright Office.
212. Macklin, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18026, at *3 (awarding the maximum against the
websites); Macklin v. Mueck, No. 00-14092-CIV MOORE, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18027 (S.D.
Fla. Mar. 10, 2005) (awarding the maximum against the two individual defendants).
213. One danger of statutory damage awards in default judgment cases is that the plaintiff
20091
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Even defendants with plausible noninfringement defenses have
been confronted with maximum statutory damage awards. In
Greaver v. National Ass'n of Corporate Directors, for example, the
plaintiff was an independent contractor whom NACD had hired to
develop materials for and conduct seminars on issues of interest to
chief financial officers.2 14 After NACD informed Greaver that his
services were no longer required, it hired another person to develop
comparable seminar materials and instructed him not to reuse
Greaver's materials.215 The second consultant's materials were,
however, found to be substantially similar to Greaver's.216 The court
ruled that NACD's infringement was willful and awarded Greaver
$100,000 in statutory damages, the maximum possible at that
time,217 making no effort to explain why this high award was
justified.
Even more questionable was the maximum statutory damage
award in Lipton v. Nature Co.2"8 Lipton, an etymologist and author
of a book entitled An Exaltation of Larks, sued Nature Co. and its
supplier, Wein, for copyright infringement for making and selling
scarves and other items on which were printed seventy-two terms
of venery (for example, a pod of whales, a gaggle of geese) that
Lipton claimed infringed a section of Larks."9 Wein at first claimed
to have found these terms in a public domain source, but when
Lipton sued for infringement, Wein contested the copyrightability
of the compilation.22 ° The trial judge granted summary judgment to
may not actually be eligible for a statutory damage award. It seems unlikely, for instance,
that Macklin, a prisoner, would have filed a copyright registration in a timely manner, but,
without a live defendant to raise the ineligibility defense, it may be easy for courts to
overlook the eligibility issue. Another danger is awarding enhanced damages for willful
infringement in default judgment cases based only on the pleadings, as in Macklin. A better
rule would treat defaults as admitting liability for general damages and require proof of
willfulness beyond that pleaded in the complaint.
214. No. 94-2127 (WBB), 1997 WL 34605245 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 1997).
215. Id. at *2.
216. Id.
217. Id. at *7. The court did not attempt to explain why the maximum award was
appropriate or to estimate actual damages or the defendant's profits attributable to
infringement.
218. 71 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995).
219. Id. at 467.
220. Wein also contested the court's jurisdiction over him. Lipton v. Nature Co., 781 F.
Supp. 1032, 1034-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
482 [Vol. 51:439
STATUTORY DAMAGES IN COPYRIGHT LAW
Lipton, holding that Wein's infringement was willful and awarding
Lipton maximum possible statutory damages. 221 The Second Circuit
concluded that the venery terms were sufficiently original to qualify
for copyright protection but reversed the finding of willfulness,
saying the defendant's state of mind was a question of fact that
should be tried before a jury.222 But the trial judge was evidently
ready to throw the book at Wein notwithstanding the low rep-
rehensibility of the defendant's conduct-the compilation was only
just barely copyrightable, and Wein could reasonably have thought
the terms were in the public domain. The ratio of punitive to actual
damages in this case was almost certainly well in excess of the 10:1
guideline,223 and the actual damage award would likely have been
much smaller if statutory damages had not been available as a
remedy.224 In "thin" copyright cases, such as Lipton, statutory
damages ought to approximate actual damages or, at most, be
based on small multiples over estimated actual damages.225
Another unfortunate practice evident in the case law occurs when
courts start with the statutory maximum and work backwards from
there, insofar as the defendant is not at the most reprehensible end
of the spectrum. In Childress v. Taylor,226 for example, Childress
sued Taylor for infringement after Taylor rewrote a play on which
they had previously collaborated. 227 Taylor argued that the earlier
play was a joint work and that the later play was a lawful deriva-
tive of it; Childress disputed the joint work argument and claimed
221. Lipton, 71 F.3d at 472.
222. Id. at 472-73.
223. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
224. Lipton, 71 F.3d at 470.
225. Another "thin" copyright case in which grossly excessive maximum statutory
damages were awarded is Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co.,
74 F.3d 488 (4th Cir. 1996). Dan Chase challenged the copyrightability of mannequins for
animal forms as useful articles, id. at 492, which was plausible given Carol Barnhart, Inc.
v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985) (ruling that human mannequins were
unprotectable useful articles). After the court upheld Superior's copyright in the forms, the
jury awarded $400,000 in statutory damages for four infringements, even though the
defendant's profits from the infringement were at most ten thousand dollars. Dan Chase, 74
F.3d at 496. The principal factor tending to heighten reprehensibility was that Dan Chase
had been charged with copyright infringement in the past. Id. at 497.
226. 798 F. Supp. 981 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
227. The judge rejected as speculative Childress's arguments for $71,000 in actual
damages. Id. at 989-92.
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that the rewrite infringed her play.228 Despite the plausibility of
Taylor's defense, the trial judge ruled that she was a willful in-
fringer and ordered Taylor to pay $30,000 in statutory damages.229
The statutory maximum of $50,000 was, he decided, not necessary
because Taylor had paid Childress to write the underlying play and
had made many contributions to it.23° Because Childress had not
proved any damages, the statutory award was "primarily punitive
in nature."23'
Another erroneous conception of the enhanced statutory damage
provision of copyright law seems to have caused the trial court in
Zomba Enterprises, Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., to award the
plaintiff $31,000 per infringed work for making unauthorized
karoke disks of Zomba's music. 2 2 Panorama argued to the Sixth
Circuit that the statutory damage award should be reduced because
the trial court erroneously believed that, once it found the infringe-
ment to be willful, the statutory award must be above $30,000 per
work.233 Although Panorama could not point to a specific statement
in the record to support this claim, its theory is plausible, for there
is no apparent explanation for the use of the otherwise unusual
figure of $31,000 per work as the proper measure of statutory
damages in this case. The Sixth Circuit deferentially observed that
"Panorama's willfulness prompted the district court to conclude
that the maximum penalty for nonwillful infringement was not
sufficient given Panorama's conduct."234 Yet, in many other cases
involving willful infringers, courts have not found it necessary to
228. Childress v. Taylor, No. 87 Civ. 6924 (CSH), 1990 WL 196013 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28,
1990), affd, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991).
229. Childress, 798 F. Supp. at 997.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. 491 F.3d 574, 580 (6th Cir. 2007).
233. Id. at 586. Recall that $30,000 is the maximum that can be awarded in the middle
range of the statutory damage provision (which we have described as the remedy for
"ordinary infringements"). See supra note 78 and accompanying text. This number also is the
apparent dividing line above which enhanced damages for willful infringement can be made.
The lower court in Zomba also mistakenly believed that the $750-$30,000 range applied only
to innocent infringement. See Zomba, 491 F.3d at 586 (quoting the lower court opinion).
234. Zomba, 491 F.3d at 586. We agree with the Sixth Circuit's assessment that
'Panorama's ... fair-use defense was objectively unreasonable." Id. at 585. Yet, we view
Panorama as far less reprehensible than willful infringers such as the defendants in the
Edde and Peri cases. See supra notes 188-96 and accompanying text.
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start at the first step of the enhancement ladder in making stat-
utory damage awards.235 Had Zomba not promptly registered its
copyrights, the actual damage and profit award would have been
$28,151.236 Panorama argued that the $806,000 award was "grossly
excessive" under Gore and its progeny because it was 37 times the
compensatory award, but the Sixth Circuit brushed aside this
argument, holding that Gore does not apply to statutory damage
awards.237
Inconsistent statutory damage rulings in factually similar
cases are, moreover, easy to find.238 In one set of cases, the same
235. See, e.g., Arclightz & Films Pvt. Ltd. v. Video Palace, Ltd., 303 F. Supp. 2d 356, 363
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) ($750 per work award against maker of counterfeit movie); Lauratex Textile
Corp. v. Allton Knitting Mills Inc., 519 F. Supp. 730, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ($40,000 against
repeat infringer).
236. Zomba, 491 F.3d at 586 n.10.
237. Id. at 586-87. The court relied upon a 1919 decision in St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S.
Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63 (1919) for the proposition that statutory damage awards
should be judged under a more deferential standard. Zomba, 491 F.3d at 587-88.
238. Even on the exact same facts, inconsistent awards may occur. See, e.g., Columbia
Pictures Television v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 106 F.3d 284 (9th Cir. 1997)
(awarding $8.8 million in statutory damages for unauthorized broadcast of television
programs), rev'd, 523 U.S. 340 (1998), remanded to Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. v.
Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 259 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2001) (awarding $31 million for
same infringement). Inconsistencies have arisen in lawsuits involving unauthorized
broadcasts of music. See, e.g., SESAC, Inc. v. WPNT, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 531 (W.D. Pa.
2003) (refusing request for a new trial on damages after jury came back with $1,263,000
statutory damage award which was more than 200 times the lost license fee); Rodgers v.
Quests, Inc., 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 212 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (awarding $27,750 in statutory
damages for willful infringement for unlicensed radio broadcasts of music). Awards in news
clipping cases also have been inconsistent. See, e.g., L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791
(9th Cir. 1992) (awarding $20,000 for infringement of two works); Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan,
744 F.2d 1490, 1499 n.16 (11th Cir. 1984) (awarding $35 for unauthorized news clipping).
Other inconsistencies are evident in lawsuits against individual file sharers. Most of these
lawsuits have settled for $2,000-$5,000. Barker, supra note 14, at 528 n.19. Statutory
damage awards against some filesharers who have gone to trial have been set at the
statutory minimum. See, e.g., BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005)
(awarding $750 per song for a total award of $22,500). Yet, in at least one case, the judge
persuaded the RIAA to settle for $200 per infringed work, saying that the defendant's
innocent infringement defense was plausible. See Maverick Recording Co. v. Harper, No.
5:07-CV-026-XR (W.D. Tex. Aug. 7,2008); see also Eric Bangeman, RIAA Now Wants to Avoid
Trial in Innocent Infringement Case, ARsTECHNICA, Oct. 19, 2008, http://arstechnica.com
tech-pohlicy/news/2008110/riaa-now-wants-to-avoid-trial-in-innocent-infringement-case.ars.
Yet, as previously noted, Jammie Thomas was punished by a statutory award of $9,250 per
infringed song for a total award of $220,000. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
See also Wheatland, supra note 1 (giving an example of inconsistent damage awards for
comparable infringements under Japanese and U.S. law).
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recording industry firm challenging comparable acts of infringe-
ment (continuing to make and sell records after a compulsory
license was terminated) and obtained statutory damage awards of
$10,000 per infringed work in one case,239 $30,000 per infringed
work in another,2 40 and $50,000 per infringed work in a third.24' No
effort was made to align the awards or explain the discrepancies.
Even more wildly inconsistent rulings can be found in cases
involving the posting of infringing materials on the Internet. For
making considerable portions of five Scientology texts available on
the Internet, Lerma was ordered to pay the statutory damage
minimum of $2,500.242 Free Republic, however, was hit with a $1
million statutory damage award for posting an unspecified number
of newspaper articles on its nonprofit website, and Mueck was
punished by a $300,000 award for posting two poems on the
Internet.2 43 No meaningful explanation was given in the Free
Republic or Macklin cases for imposing maximum awards.
Photocopying has yielded similarly inconsistent statutory dam-
age rulings. In Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., the
court awarded the plaintiff the statutory maximum of $50,000 per
infringed work for nine works and $20,000 per infringed work for
three others because Kinko's' duplication of "coursepacks" for
university students infringed copyrights in the book chapters and
articles they contained.2 44 For engaging in exactly the same
239. Peer Int'l Corp. v. Luna Records, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
240. Peer Int'l Corp. v. Max Music & Entm't, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 0996KMWDF, 2004 WL
1542253 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2004).
241. Peer Int'l Corp. v. Pausa Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1990).
242. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, CIV.A. No. 95-1107-A, 1996 WL 633131, at *16 (E.D.
Va. Oct. 4, 1996). The statutory damage award against Veeck for posting the entirety of a
building code on the Internet was also a $500 minimum award before the ruling against him
was reversed on other grounds. Veeck v. So. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 885
(E.D. Tex. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (ruling that the code
in question was not protectable by copyright law).
243. See supra notes 99-100, 209-12 and accompanying text. Talisman similarly was
punished with a maximum award for posting photos of nude women on the Internet. Perfect
10, Inc. v. Talisman Commns., Inc., No. CV99-10450 RAP MCX, 2000 WL 364813 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 27, 2000).
244. 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1543-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The total award in Kinko's was $510,000.
Id. One might argue that the total award was actually quite modest, given that Kinko's had
launched a nationwide coursepack copying service and many infringements had occurred
besides the dozen at issue in the case. Id. at 1526. There are at least three problems with this
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practice, Michigan Document Services was subject to a statutory
damage award of $5,000 per infringed work.245 Yet the Sixth Circuit
reversed this award as excessive because Michigan Document
Services reasonably believed it was engaged in fair use.246
One might have expected the statutory damage award in Legg
Mason to be considerably lower given that the firm was not directly
engaged in commercial exploitation of copies, as was the case in
Kinko's or Michigan Document Services; the copying was instead
done by a few members of a research group from newsletters to
which the firm subscribed.247 Yet, Legg Mason was punished with
a $19.7 million award.248 This award is almost forty times larger
than the award in Kinko's and more than thirteen times the
statutory damage award against Peri, a notorious infringer who had
made and sold almost two million counterfeit records. There is
simply no way that Legg Mason's infringement was that much more
reprehensible than Kinko's' or Peri's.
Like the Sixth Circuit in Zomba, the trial judge in Legg Mason
dismissed the defendant's due process argument, saying that Gore
and State Farm do not apply to statutory damages because it is
often difficult to prove damages in copyright cases.249 The trial
judge also characterized copyright statutory damages as "carefully
crafted and reasonably constrained."'25 The award in Legg Mason,
in itself, calls this assertion into question.
Legg Mason is one of several copyright cases in which the ag-
gregation of per work claims has led to grossly excessive punitive
perspective. First, the nonplaintiff owners of copyrights of other works infringed by Kinko's
were not before the court, and it seems wrong for Basic Books to get a windfall statutory
damage award as to works in which it does not own copyrights. Second, to the extent that
the enhancement was aimed at other infringements, the court had no basis for knowing
whether the other works whose copyrights were infringed had been registered promptly so
that they were eligible to be considered for statutory damages. Third, the high award per
work sets a precedent that may affect damage rulings in other photocopying type cases such
as Legg Mason.
245. Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 855 F. Supp. 905, 913 (E.D. Mich.
1994) (equaling a total award of $30,000).
246. Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1392 (6th Cir. 1996).
247. Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 737, 742-42 (D. Md. 2003).
248. Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455, 455 (D. Md. 2004).
The maximum exposure was $36 million. Id. at 459 n.3.
249. Id. at 459-60.
250. Id. at 460.
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damage awards. Had the jury awarded the minimum statutory
damage for the firm's internal copying of Lowry's newsletters, Legg
Mason would have had to pay $180,000, a sum which would have
provided significant compensation to Lowry's and almost certainly
would have deterred the firm from further unlicensed copying. This
award would have been three times the actual damages of roughly
$60,000.251 The firm's reprehensibility was low in view of its plau-
sible, even if unsuccessful, fair use claim.252 The ratio of punish-
ment to actual harm exceeded 300:1,253 or more than thirty times
the 10:1 ratio that Gore and State Farm viewed as the apex of
reasonable ratios and twice the 145:1 ratio that State Farm said
was presumptively unconstitutional.
54
Aggregation of per work infringement claims also has led to
grossly excessive statutory damage awards in cases challenging
new technological uses of copyrighted works. The ruling of willful
infringement and the high statutory damage award in UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com sent a shockwave of chilling effects
throughout the innovative digital technology and services commu-
nity in 2000.255 After ruling against MP3.com's fair use defense,
256
the main reason the judge gave for such a substantial award
focused on the perceived need to deter other Internet entrepreneurs
from similar lawless behavior:
[Tihere is no doubt in the Court's mind that the potential for
huge profits in the rapidly expanding world of the Internet is
the lure that tempted an otherwise generally responsible
251. See Legg Mason's Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for a New Trial and
Judgment as a Matter of Law at 3-9, Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 271 F. Supp.
2d 737 (D. Md. 2003) (No. WDQ 01-3898) [hereinafter Legg Mason Memorandum]. Even this
figure is relatively high, as it represents the cost of extra subscriptions instead of a possible
license fee to make extra copies of particular articles, which one would expect would be less
than the price of whole issues.
252. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
253. See Legg Mason Memorandum, supra note 251, at 2 (estimating that the verdict gave
Lowry's 86 times its actual damages as to a first phase of copying, more than 2500 times
actual damages in a second phase, and 4500 times damages for a third phase; the award was
also 320 times the plaintiffs average net income).
254. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
255. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 17, at 270. The Nimmer treatise is critical of the
disproportionately high award in MP3.com. NEhIMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 14.04[E] [1].
256. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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company like MP3.com to break the law and that will also tempt
others to do so if too low a level is set for the statutory damages
in this case. Some of the evidence in this case strongly suggests
that some companies operating in the area of the Internet may
have a misconception that, because their technology is some-
what novel, they are somehow immune from the ordinary
applications of laws of the United States, including copyright
law. They need to understand that the law's domain knows no
such limits.25 '
It is inconsistent with due process principles to make such a large
award in order to deter strangers to the litigation."5
Many other technology and service providers have been at risk
for similarly huge or even more huge statutory damage awards for
making new technologies or providing new services to persons who
might use them to infringe copyrights.259 Internet service providers,
such as YouTube, and makers of MP3 players, peer-to-peer tech-
nologies, and digital video recorders, among others, have either
been sued or threatened with suits for contributory copyright
infringement."26 Venture capitalists who provide financial and other
support for developers of innovative new technologies and services
have recognized the "crushing implications" of statutory damage
awards which have severe chilling effects on investments in such
firms.261 This is especially worrisome because it is impossible for a
257. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 472 (JSR), 2000 WL 1262568, at
*6 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (emphasis added).
258. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007) (punitive award
should not punish a defendant for wrongs done to "strangers to the litigation"); supra note
166; see also PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 9, at § 22:181, at 22-433 to 22-435
(noting that the MP3.com award is inconsistent with Philip Morris).
259. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 17, at 268-72.
260. Id.
261. See Brief of the National Venture Capital Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 4-5, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (No.
04-480) (2005) [hereinafter Brief of the National Venture Capital Ass'n].
It is critical to understand that the threat of secondary liability from copyright
suits is qualitatively different from most other sorts of business risk that
investors can insure against or build into their risk calculations. The
mandatory mechanism of statutory damages--designed to discourage direct
infringement-has crushing implications for vendors of multi-purpose
technologies, where damages from unforeseen users can quickly mount in the
millions and even billions of dollars.
Id. at 16-17. Company executives and engineers may also be sued; even venture capitalists
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developer to know in advance, let alone to control, which of a firm's
many potential users will infringe certain copyrights and whether
the rights holders of those copyrights will qualify for statutory
damages.262 Risk exposure may easily run into the billion dollar
range.263
Aggregation poses similarly grave risks of grossly excessive
awards in class action copyright cases.264 Although class action
lawsuits are rare in copyright cases, they are not unknown.265 In a
case brought against Bertelsmann AG for contributing to Napster's
infringement through its investment and control of Napster,
plaintiffs sought class certification for a class of music publishers
whose copyrighted works had been infringed by users of Napster's
p2p filesharing system.266 Although the judge granted the class
certification, she recognized the risk of a grossly excessive aggre-
gated statutory damage award that would run afoul of due process
principles articulated in Gore and State Farm .267 The Author's Guild
v. Google, Inc. case is another example of a class action copyright
lawsuit on behalf of authors of millions of books that Google
and lawyers have sometimes been sued for contributing to the contributory infringements
of their clients. See Berg, supra note 17, at 271 n.23.
262. Technology developers currently benefit from the safe harbor that the Supreme Court
created in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Pictures, Inc. for technologies that have or are
capable of substantial noninfringing uses. 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). That safe harbor came
under attack in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928-30
(2005), in which MGM argued for a much stricter standard for secondary liability of
technology and service providers. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Three Reactions to the
Grokster Decision, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 177, 182-83 (2006) (discussing
MGM's preferred liability standards). It was to counter this stricter standard that the
National Venture Capital Association submitted an amicus curiae brief in that case. Brief
of the National Venture Capital Ass'n, supra note 261, at 2.
263. Brief of the National Venture Capital Ass'n, supra note 261, at 4-5.
264. See Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The Problem of Statutory Damages
and Class Actions, 74 MO. L. REV. 103, 104 (2009).
265. See, e.g., In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 509 F.3d 116, 116-
17, 127 (2d Cir. 2007) (vacating class certification and settlement as to authors whose articles
were wrongfully included in electronic databases, but who had not registered copyright
claims), cert. granted (U.S. Mar. 2, 2009) (No. 08-103).
266. In re Napster, Inc., No. C MDL-00-1369 MPH, 2005 WL 1287611, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
June 1, 2005).
267. Id. at *10; see also Parker v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 331 F.3d 13, 22 (2d Cir. 2003)
(expressing concern about potential for an excessive award of statutory damages for privacy
violations in class action lawsuit, but ruling that these concerns should not prevent class
certification). See infra note 298 and accompanying text for a discussion of Gore and State
Farm.
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scanned.26 Even an award of the statutory minimum of $750 per
book would yield approximately $4.5 billion in liability.26 9 In the
hands of Judge Rakoff, Google's liability could soar far above this
outrageously large sum for making a digital library of books.27 °
D. Punitive Statutory Damage Awards Are Subject to Due
Process Limits
While we agree with Judge Patel and other commentators that
the due process principles of Gore and its progeny are implicated
when statutory damage awards in copyright cases are grossly
excessive,2 71 we acknowledge that the courts in Zomba and Legg
Mason have opined otherwise. In Zomba, the Sixth Circuit ques-
tioned whether Gore and its progeny applied to statutory damage
awards, ultimately holding that such damages should be reviewed
under the more deferential standard established in the Court's 1919
decision, St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Railway Co. v. Williams, until
the U.S. Supreme Court holds otherwise. 2  In Legg Mason, a trial
268. See Class Action Complaint at 2, Author's Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8136
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2005). A similar lawsuit was filed by five publishers. Google recently
announced that it reached a settlement agreement with the Author's Guild, which is
designated as the class representative for authors, and the Association of American
Publishers, which is now designated as the class representative for publishers, to end this
litigation. Under the agreement, Google will provide $45 million in funds to pay authors who
register their claims of copyright with the newly created Book Rights Registry. See Google
Book Search Settlement Agreement, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/agreement/ (last
visited Oct. 29, 2009).
269. Of the estimated seven million books in the Book Search database at this point,
approximately one million are in the public domain. See, e.g., Posting of Leanne Johnson to
TKBR Wiki:PUB802, Library or Book Store: Google's Book Search, http://thinkubator.ccsp.
sfu.calwikis/PUB802/LibraryOrBookstoreGooglesBookSearch (Feb. 16,2009). Although it is
far from clear that all of the rights holders of the six million in-copyright books would be
eligible for statutory damages, it is useful to realize the potential exposure that Google was
facing.
270. If one modeled the fair use analysis in the Authors Guild case on Judge Rakoffs
analysis in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. ROM, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), Google
would seem at high risk for liability because it was systematically copying the whole of
millions of books without clearing rights with copyright owners and storing the electronic
texts in a large database that it intended to "beam" to paying customers. However, some
commentators have argued that scanning to index books and make snippets available was
fair use. See, e.g., Hannibal Travis, Google Book Search and Fair Use: iTunes for Authors,
or Napster for Books?, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 87, 91-92 (2006).
271. See sources cited supra notes 162-63.
272. Zomba Enter., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 587 (6th Cir. 2007)
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court asserted that Gore and its progeny did not apply because
damages are often difficult to prove in copyright cases and because
Congress had carefully calibrated copyright's statutory damages
regime.273
Our response to Zomba begins with the observation that the
Supreme Court has applied due process excessiveness reviews to a
wide variety of sanctions-not just to punitive damages, but also to
civil fines, forfeitures, criminal penalties, and other deprivations of
liberty or property.274 Gore also recognized that although legisla-
tures have broad discretion to establish remedies for wrongful
conduct, they must still exercise this discretion in a manner that
comports with due process.275 Thus, the fact that Congress has
included a statutory damage provision in U.S. copyright law does
not, in itself, insulate this law, or particular awards of statutory
damages in specific copyright cases, from due process review.
Courts have struck down numerous awards as excessive, even when
they fell within a legislatively-imposed cap.276
We do, however, agree with the Sixth Circuit that special con-
siderations apply when legislatures create a statutory damage
regime aimed at deterring harms to the public when the actual
damages suffered by any one individual may be so small that the
law would be persistently underenforced in the absence of a
(discussing St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63 (1919)). See supra
notes 232-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of Zomba.
273. Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455,460 (D. Md. 2004). See
supra notes 247-52 and accompanying text for additional discussion of Legg Mason.
274. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433-35
(2000). Insofar as statutory damages go beyond merely compensating copyright owners for
harms attributable to infringement, they serve, and have been recognized as serving,
punitive as well as deterrent purposes. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text; see also
Evanson, supra note 21, at 602 ("[D]ue to the risks of arbitrary and excessive statutory
awards, Gore and State Farm's due process review should be exacted on every extra-
compensatory award."). Gore and its progeny seem to regard extra-compensatory awards as
punitive. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580-82 (1995); see also Cooper
Industries, 532 U.S. at 432.
275. Gore, 517 U.S. at 572-73.
276. See, e.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) (finding due process
violation in application of forfeiture provision); Rubinstein v. Adm'rs of the Tulane Educ.
Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 403-09 (5th Cir. 2000) (reducing punitive damage award under equal
employment laws even though it was below the statutory maximum); see also sources cited
in Evanson, supra note 21, at 623 n.145. Damages limited by a legislatively-imposed cap
function similarly to statutory damages within a specified range.
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statutory damage remedy. Consider, for instance, the award in St.
Louis Railway.27 ' In order to deter railroads from overcharging
their customers for transport within Arkansas-something that the
railroads would otherwise be sorely tempted to do-the state
legislature established a penalty for overcharges ranging between
$50 and $300.278 After the St. Louis Railway charged the Williams
sisters 660 more than the prescribed fare for their route, the sisters
sued and were each awarded $75 in statutory damages.2 79 The
railroad challenged the extra-compensatory award as a deprivation
of its property without due process of law.2 0 Even though the award
represented a high multiple over the actual damages, the Supreme
Court affirmed the Arkansas court's ruling in favor of the Williams
sisters and observed:
When [the penalty] is considered with due regard for the
interests of the public, the numberless opportunities for commit-
ting the offense, and the need for securing uniform adherence to
established passenger rates, we think it properly cannot be said
to be so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to
the offense or obviously unreasonable.281
Similar concerns about protecting the public against wrongful
acts by unscrupulous firms have induced legislatures to create
statutory damage remedies to address a wide range of public
harms, such as the sending of junk faxes,282 failure to comply with
support orders, 2 3 displays of Indian-style arts and crafts in a
277. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 64 (1919).
278. Id. at 63-64. The statute also allowed recovery of costs, including a reasonable
attorney fee.
279. Id. at 64. The sisters also recovered the costs of suit, including an attorney's fee of
$25.
280. Id. at 64-65.
281. Id. at 67. It bears mentioning that the Court decided St. Louis Railway in 1919, and
given its modern due process jurisprudence, the Court might not view the penalty in that
case in the same way today. Nothing in the Court's modern punitive damage jurisprudence
suggests that the Court regards St. Louis Railway as the controlling precedent for deferring
to statutory damage regimes, and much in that jurisprudence suggests otherwise. See
Scheuerman, supra note 264, at 122-27 (questioning courts' failure to apply Gore to awards
of statutory damages).
282. See, e.g., Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1162, 1166 (S.D. Ind. 1997)
(refusing to strike down $500 junk fax award under Gore and its progeny).
283. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Chen and Ulner, 820 N.E.2d 1136, 1152 (111. App. Ct. 2004)
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manner that falsely suggests they were made by Indians,8 4 and
violations of cable television privacy rules.8 8 Statutory damages for
these offenses are typically fixed in relatively small amounts,
usually under $1,000, and apply to a specific and narrowly-defined
type of conduct. 2 6 Even though the statutory awards authorized
under such circumstances may seem excessive in relation to actual
harm likely to be suffered by individual victims, courts tend to defer
to legislative decisions that carefully calibrate statutory damages
to specific harms, and uphold awards made under such carefully
calibrated statutes.287
However, even when the legislature has exercised care in
establishing a specific statutory award for specific wrongful con-
duct, due process concerns may arise insofar as claims are aggre-
gated, as in a class action. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized "the potential for a devastatingly large damages award"
in connection with its consideration of whether the risk of an
excessive award should preclude certification of a class action
against a cable television company for violating its twelve million
customers' privacy rights. 2"8 The court observed that "the aggrega-
tion in a class action of large numbers of statutory damages claims
potentially distorts the purpose of both statutory damages and
class actions. 28 9 The court was concerned that the potential for an
excessive award would have "an in terrorem effect on defendants,
(upholding $100-per-day penalty for employer's failure to comply with support order).
284. See, e.g., Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Bundy-Howard, 168 F. Supp. 2d 905, 914-15 (N.D.
Ill. 2001) (upholding $1,000 per day fine for falsely displaying such goods to protect
consumers against counterfeit products and to preserve Native American culture).
285. See, e.g., Parker v. Time Warner Entm't, 331 F.3d 13, 23 (2d Cir. 2003) (Newman, J.,
concurring) (ordering $1,000 penalty for violating privacy of cable television subscribers).
286. See, e.g., Evanson, supra note 21, at 619 n.123 (giving examples). Some statutory
remedies provide for a narrow range within which awards can be made. See Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A) (2006) (allowing awards of actual damages or of
statutory damages between $100 and $1,000).
287. See, e.g., Kenro, 962 F. Supp. at 1166 (upholding $500 penalty for sending junk faxes
because "Congress designed a remedy that would take into account the difficult to quantify
business interruption costs imposed upon recipients of unsolicited fax advertisements,
effectively deter the unscrupulous practice of shifting these costs to unwitting recipients of
'junk faxes,' and 'provide adequate incentive for an individual plaintiff to bring suit on his
own behalf').
288. Parker, 331 F.3d at 21-22.
289. Id.
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which may induce unfair settlements."'29 The Second Circuit
assumed that it had power under Gore to order a reduction of a
grossly excessive award in such a case so as to comport with due
process.291
Statutory damages in copyright law are, of course, not fixed in
amount, nor are they fixed within a narrow range. They also apply
not just to one specific type of misconduct, nor to a narrow range of
conduct, but to a wide range of activities as to a vast array of works.
The boundaries of copyright law are, moreover, unclear in many
contexts; whether a use is fair or unfair, whether the defendant
took only unprotectable parts from an earlier work, and whether
two contributors to the same project are joint authors are just a few
of the dozens of issues that are often hotly contested in copyright
cases. Copyright statutory damages aim, moreover, to rectify a
private wrong by compensating copyright owners for economic
harms done from infringement and not to remedy the sorts of public
wrongs at which most statutory damage rules are aimed. For these
reasons, we think that the trial judge in Legg Mason was simply
wrong in concluding that Congress had calibrated copyright
statutory damages so carefully that any award under § 504(c) is
insulated from due process review.292
An award made under a statute may fail Gore scrutiny when, like
the U.S. copyright statutory damage provision, it "merely specifies
a wide range within which an award must fall, leaving gross
discretion to the judiciary or when the aggregation of an amount
on a per violation basis case presents a situation not considered
by the legislature." '293 In particular, Congress did not foresee or
appropriately calibrate statutory damages as to many challenging
new technology cases, such as MP3.com, Free Republic, and
Thomas.294 Excessive copyright statutory damage awards are,
290. Id.
291. Id. Barker argues that aggregation and grossly excessive awards are also problematic
in p2p filesharing cases. Barker, supra note 14, at 525-26. He relies in part on the analysis
in Parker in support of this argument. Id. at 550-5 1.
292. Evanson found "no evidence from the legislative history [of the 1976 Act] that the
statutory range reflects an optimal level of deterrence or retribution" and noted that "the
statutory range is so wide that it makes possible both reasonable awards and unreasonable
awards." Evanson, supra note 21, at 620-21.
293. Id. at 603.
294. See supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
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moreover, likely to have other negative spillover effects, such as
chilling lawful, even if close to the boundary, uses of copyrighted
works, especially those that would promote freedom of speech and
freedom of expression, as well as the development of innovative new
technologies and services.295
That damages in copyright cases are sometimes difficult to prove
may have been the initial impetus for creating a general statutory
damage provision in U.S. copyright law.296 However, this is no
longer its principal rationale, nor its main role, in copyright law. In
the overwhelming majority of copyright cases, the harm to the
rights holder (such as lost license fees) and any unjust enrichment
to the defendant attributable to infringement are reasonably dis-
cernible.29 It is, in fact, remarkably common for courts to consider
plaintiffs damages and defendant's profits as part of its assessment
of the proper statutory damage award. It is precisely because
statutory damage awards may be grossly disproportionate to actual
harm that due process issues arise.
Yet even when copyright damages are difficult to prove, as
perhaps they were in the Free Republic case, the Supreme Court's
due process jurisprudence still has application. Gore and State
Farm both expressly recognize that difficulties in determining what
precise economic value to assign to the harm that the defendant has
caused the plaintiff may affect the reasonable ratio guidepost, but
such difficulties do not insulate such awards from due process
review.9' Courts still should consider whether the legitimate
objective of the state in establishing a remedy for certain wrongs
295. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 17, at 314-17; Reese, supra note 57, at 183-84.
296. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
297. Congress could have chosen to limit the award of statutory damages to cases in which
damages are difficult to prove, as at least one other nation has done. See supra note 171.
Congress also could have chosen to allow statutory damages to be awarded to any plaintiff
for whom damages or profits were difficult to prove instead of only to those copyright owners
who have registered their claims of copyright within three months of publication. That it has
done neither of these things suggests that this is no longer the principal rationale for
statutory damages. We would be less concerned about the potential excessiveness of
statutory damages in U.S. copyright cases if they were only available in difficult-to-prove
cases. As it is, most copyright owners have no choice but to prove their own lost profits and
the defendant's profits insofar as they registered their copyrights outside the three month
window.
298. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2002); BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1995).
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could be satisfied with a more modest award. Would an award of
less than $118 million have deterred MP3.com from further copying
of recorded music? Would less than $1 million have deterred Free
Republic from further postings of news articles? We think so, but
we think that courts should at least ask this sort of question before
making six- to nine-figure statutory damage awards in copyright
cases. Damages in copyright are no harder to compute than "injury
to reputation in a defamation case, pain and suffering in a personal
injury case, or emotional distress in an insurance bad faith case, yet
punitive damages in those situations all require [due process] exces-
siveness review." '299 Difficulties of proof cannot insulate copyright
statutory damage awards from due process review.
In short, we believe that Gore and its progeny have salience in
copyright cases, and that statutory damage awards should be
overturned or reduced when they are grossly excessive under the
Gore guideposts.
III. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Part II has demonstrated that the U.S. statutory damages regime
has been applied in a manner that often results in arbitrary,
inconsistent, unprincipled, and grossly excessive awards and that
reform is needed to address these problems. This Part begins by
situating our proposals for reform by considering the statutory
damage remedy in the context of other monetary relief that U.S.
copyright law provides to compensate copyright owners and deter
infringement. It then discusses how courts could develop principles,
derived mainly from the case law discussed in Part II.B and II.C,
which would achieve significant reform of the statutory damage
regime within the current statutory framework. Finally, it reflects
on whether statutory reform might be desirable to achieve legisla-
tive goals of compensation, deterrence, and punishment in a
manner that would be more consistent with due process principles.
299. Evanson, supra note 21, at 627.
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A. Considering Statutory Damages in the Context of Other
Copyright Remedies
Statutory damages should be considered in light of the broader
remedial scheme that Congress established for U.S. copyright
law.3 °° When infringement occurs, all copyright owners are entitled
to recover their actual damages from the infringement and what-
ever profits the defendants made that are attributable to the
infringement." 1 The actual damage recovery-that is, profits from
sales of the same or similar products or license fees not paid-is
clearly compensatory in nature. An award of the defendant's profits,
by contrast, has a largely deterrent function." 2 Recovery of the
defendant's profits ensures that the defendant will not be unjustly
enriched by infringement and cannot treat infringement as a cost
of doing business, for he will have to disgorge his profits if he
infringes. He may also have to pay the copyright owner's attorney's
fees, as well as his own.3" 3
In most cases, particularly when the infringement has generated
a lot of money, copyright owners, even those who have promptly
registered their works, will prefer to recover actual damages and
the defendant's profits rather than to elect statutory damages. The
maximum statutory award of $150,000 may, in fact, be a paltry sum
if there are millions in profits that could potentially be disgorged for
infringement of a single work (e.g., counterfeit software). It bears
mentioning that no matter how egregious the infringement, the
copyright owner who recovers its actual damages and the defen-
dant's profits is ineligible for any kind of strictly punitive award. °4
300. The Nimmer treatise supports this concept. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, §
14.04[E] [1] [a], at 14-95 (statutory damages "should be woven out of the same bolt of cloth as
actual damages" and there should be some correlation between actual damages and
defendant profits and whatever statutory damage award might be imposed).
301. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006).
302. Courts exercise care to ensure that there is no double-counting as between an award
of the defendant's profits and an award of the plaintiffs lost profits. See, e.g., Hamil America,
Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 108 n.7 (2d Cir. 1999).
303. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006). Deterrent purposes are also served by the copyright rule that
successful plaintiffs are required to prove the defendant's gross revenues, but the defendant
bears the burden of proving deductions for expenses and profits that are attributable to other
causes than infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006).
304. Punishment for egregious copyright infringement is largely left to criminal law. 17
U.S.C. § 506 (2006).
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Of course, late-registering copyright owners will not have the
opportunity to elect statutory damage awards; yet, their ability to
recover actual damages and defendant's profits will generally
achieve compensatory and modest deterrent purposes. They are
just ineligible for the extra-compensatory and potentially punitive
award of statutory damages for truly egregious infringement.
Compensation and modest deterrence must suffice in such cases in
accordance with Congress's intent.
Statutory damages clearly have a significant compensatory pur-
pose. As Part I showed, such damages have long been intended to
compensate plaintiffs in situations in which it was difficult for a
copyright owner to prove what actual damages she sustained and
what profits the defendant made or when it would be too expensive,
for example, because of a possible need to hire an expert witness, to
prove damages or profits in comparison with the amount that could
be recovered. This compensatory purpose continues to be important
in the statutory damage case law, and courts routinely consider
actual damages in assessing how much to award as statutory
damages. °5 The broadness of the middle statutory damage range
for ordinary infringement-between $750 and $30,000 per infringed
work-very likely achieves the goal of just compensation for
infringement in a wide variety of situations as to a wide variety of
works. Some part of every statutory damage award is compensa-
tory, though neither a judge nor a jury awarding such damages is
required to say how much of the award is compensatory.
Deterrence is also a legitimate goal of statutory damage awards,
and Congress unquestionably intended for them to have this
purpose. When the actual damages or the defendant's profits are
small, the $750 minimum award ensures that, even if the specific
amount of market harm caused by an infringement is small (say,
the $150 fee that a photographer would have sought from a maga-
zine for use of his photo), the copyright owner can nonetheless
obtain some compensation that makes bringing a lawsuit worth his
time and energy. The prospect of extra-compensatory and poten-
tially punitive levels of statutory damages for willful infringement
may deter some would-be infringers more than if they faced liability
305. See, e.g., PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 9, § 22:199, at 22-450 ("(M]any
court decisions have looked at actual damages as a factor in awarding statutory damages.").
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only for actual damages and profits attributable to infringement. To
what extent Congress intended statutory damages to be merely
deterrent in purpose and to what extent it intended them to be
punitive is, unfortunately, unclear."°6 What we can say with some
confidence is that the higher the multiple of a statutory damage
award as compared with the actual damages and/or defendant's
profits or an approximation thereof, the more likely the award is to
have a punitive effect as well as a punitive intent.
Our study of the history of statutory damages under the 1976 Act
has caused us to conclude that the primary reason that statutory
damage awards under the 1976 Act have too often been arbitrary,
inconsistent, unprincipled, and grossly excessive is that Congress
melded together in one statutory damage provision two things that
it should have kept separate. Exemplary statutory damages for
egregious infringements serve strong deterrent and punitive pur-
poses. Quite different is the original and still meaningful purpose
of statutory damages: to compensate plaintiffs and modestly deter
infringement in parallel with the Act's provisions allowing recovery
of actual damages and defendant's profits. Courts have too often
ignored the tripartite structure of the statutory damage provision
and awarded statutory damages for willful infringement in ordinary
infringement cases, and too rarely reduced awards to innocent
infringement levels in close fair use or other plausible noninfringe-
ment defense cases. The largely compensatory purpose of statutory
damages in innocent and ordinary infringement cases has been
undermined by overzealous plaintiffs and judges who have failed to
grasp the tripartite structure of § 504(c).
B. Reform Within the Current Statutory Framework
This section will discuss a set of principles for awarding statutory
damages in copyright cases that is consistent with due process as
306. As Part I explained, the legislative history of the 1976 Act is not entirely clear about
how much, if at all, Congress intended for statutory damages to have a punitive character.
The omission of the old "no penalty" rule and the addition of an elevated level for willful
infringements have caused some courts to construe statutory damages as having a partly
punitive purpose. When Congress raised the maximum level of statutory damages in 1999,
though, there is some legislative history indicating that punishment was part of its purpose
in doing so. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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well as with Congress's intent that awards of statutory damages be
"just."3 7 These principles are, for the most part, extracted from the
cases discussed in Part II to help judges and litigants to understand
the "do's" and "don'ts" of statutory damage awards. A sound
jurisprudence of statutory damage awards can be developed if
courts follow these principles.
1. What Courts Should Do
The following principles illustrate what courts should do when
awarding copyright statutory damages:
" Consider awarding the reduced minimum damages authorized for
"innocent" infringements in close fair use cases or in other cases
in which the noninfringement claim was strong, even if ulti-
mately not compelling.
3 08
" Award the minimum statutory damages in cases of ordinary
infringement when:
. the plaintiff lost no profits and the defendant made no
profits from the infringement, or when damages and
profits are nominal or minimal;
39
- the infringement was technical in nature;310
307. It is fairly common for judges to recite a set of factors that should be considered in
awarding statutory damages. This has not, however, necessarily led to soundly reasoned
analyses about the level of award that was appropriate given the harm to the plaintiff. See,
e.g., Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, 302 F. Supp. 2d 455, 461 (D. Md. 2004) (instructing
jury on a number of factors to consider in awarding statutory damages, including the
defendant's wealth).
308. See, e.g., Maverick Recording Co. v. Harper, No. 5:07-CV-026-XR, slip op. at 14 (W.D.
Tex. Aug. 7, 2008) (judge persuaded the plaintiff to settle a p2p filesharing case for the
reduced minimum of $200 per infringed work because the defendant's innocent infringement
argument was plausible).
309. See, e.g., Bly v. Banbury Books, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 983, 985-86, 988 (E.D. Pa. 1986)
(awarding minimum statutory damages for unauthorized use of software when plaintiffs
damages were nominal); Reader's DigestAss'n, Inc. v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 642 F. Supp.
144-45 (D.D.C. 1986) (awarding minimum statutory damages for infringement of magazine
covers when harm to plaintiff was minimal); Quinto v. Legal Times of Wash., Inc., 511 F.
Supp. 579, 580, 582 (D.D.C. 1981) (awarding minimum damages for newspaper's repro-
duction of law review article when plaintiff suffered only nominal damages); Doehrer v.
Caldwell, No. 79 C 394, 1980 WL 1158, at **1-2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 1980) (awarding minimum
damages for political campaign's infringement of political cartoon when plaintiff suffered only
nominal damages).
310. See, e.g., Bly, 638 F. Supp. at 986, 988 (awarding minimum damages for RAM
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- the plaintiff or the plaintiffs lawyer has engaged in
misconduct;311 or
- the defendant had a plausible fair use or other nonin-
fringement argument (unless the plaintiffs lost profits or
defendant's profits justify a larger award).312
" Ask the parties to offer proof of damages and profits, or, in the
alternative, to demonstrate why damages or profits are suffi-
ciently difficult to prove that it is justifiable to offer no such
proof.3
13
" In ordinary direct infringement cases, award statutory damages
in amounts that approximate the damages/profits that would
copying).
311. See, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 740, 745 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) ("Warner has been pressing this litigation for over three years for the purpose of
collecting disproportionately large statutory damages and attorneys' fees."); Reader's Digest,
642 F. Supp. at 145-46 (expressing concern about aggressiveness of the plaintiffs lawyer and
baseless claims).
312. See, e.g., MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182, 187 (2d Cir. 1981) (lowering $32,500
statutory damage award for bawdy song to $250 in close fair use case); Warner Bros. Entm't
v. RDR Books, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 545-46, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (awarding minimum
statutory damages against defendants who had good faith beliefs that they had only made
fair use of the plaintiffs' works); Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 63 F. Supp. 2d 420, 427
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (awarding minimum damages for transmitting broadcast radio over the
telephone because fair use claim was plausible and there was no real damage to plaintiff);
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, CIV.A. No. 95-1107-A, 1996 WL 633131, at *6, *13, *15 (E.D.
Va. Oct. 4, 1996) (awarding minimum statutory damages for infringement of Scientology
texts posted on the Internet when fair use defense was plausible).
313. This is one of the most important exhortations we have for courts wrestling with
determinations of copyright statutory damages. Many of the other principles we set forth
here, such as ensuring that punitive sanctions are reasonably related to actual harm and
ensuring that similarly situated defendants are subjected to similar awards, are difficult to
achieve if the court has no facts to inform an estimate of actual damages and profits.
Plaintiffs are not, of course, required by law to present any evidence at all regarding actual
damages or defendants' profits in support of their prayer for copyright statutory damages.
Indeed, authorities agree that a plaintiff may recover statutory damages "regardless of the
adequacy of the evidence offered as to his actual damages and the amount of defendant's
profits, and even if he has intentionally declined to offer such evidence, although it was
available." NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 14.04[A]. But there is nothing that prevents
courts from refusing to award more than the statutory minimum without an offering of proof
that an amount in excess of the minimum is justified. In fact, the legislative history indicates
that this is consistent with the intention of Congress with respect to cases in which there is
no proof of actual damages and profits: "[The plaintiff in an infringement suit is not obliged
to submit proof of damages and profits and may choose to rely on the provision for minimum
statutory damages." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 161 (1975) (emphasis added).
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have been awarded if the plaintiff had not elected to receive, or
was ineligible for, a recovery of statutory damages.
- This principle should apply when the defendant did not
know his conduct was infringing, even if he should have
known that it was.
- This principle should apply in close fair use cases.
- This principle should apply in other close noninfringe-
ment cases.
- This principle should apply when the case involves a novel
issue of law such that a reasonable person in the defen-
dant's position could have believed his arguments for
noninfringement were plausible.
" Make efforts to be consistent with the level of statutory damage
awards in other factually similar situations, insofar as the other
awards are consistent with due process and Congressional
intent.314
" In secondary liability or class action cases, statutory damage
awards should approximate actual damages and the defendant's
profits insofar as awarding higher statutory damages would
result in grossly excessive awards.315
" For ordinary infringers who knew they were infringing or were
reckless about infringement, but as to whom other indicia of
egregious conduct are not present, base any award of statutory
damages at modest multiples (two or three times) over actual
damages/profits.316
314. See, e.g., Sega Enter. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 940 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(analogizing to the similar case of Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Dragon Pacific International,
40 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 1994)); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Sabella, No. C 93-04260 CW, 1996 WL
780560, at *16 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 1996) (making a similar award on similar facts); see also
supra note 199 (discussing courts' efforts to make consistent awards in cases involving
unlicensed public performances of music in taverns or similar venues).
315. See, e.g., In re Napster, No. C MDL-00-1369 MPH, 2005 WL 1287611, at *10 (N.D.
Cal. June 1, 2005) (giving credence to due process concerns about grossly excessive statutory
damage awards in copyright cases).
316. See, e.g., Hi-Tech Video Prods., Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 950,952,
957-59 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (awarding three times the ordinary license fee for infringement of
portions of Good Morning America program); U.S. Songs, Inc. v. Downside Lenox, Inc., 771
F. Supp. 1220, 1229 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (awarding approximately three times the license fee to
which the plaintiff was entitled); Falacci v. New Gazette Literary Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1172,
1173-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (awarding twice the author's normal translation fee for unauthorized
translation of a copyrighted interview).
20091 503
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:439
" If the judge decides to award attorney's fees in addition to
statutory damages, he or she should, when possible, consider the
size of the fee award in determining the amount of statutory
damages that are necessary to compensate the plaintiff and deter
further infringement. 17
" Base any enhanced statutory damage award for "willful infringe-
ment" on multiples above two to three times damages/profits or
a best approximation, but only to the extent there are factors
showing egregiousness of the infringement beyond the fact that
the defendant knew his acts were infringing (for example, a
repeat infringer or counterfeit operations).31
" Require clear and convincing evidence of willfulness before
imposing higher ratios of statutory damages.1 9
" If damages and profits are truly difficult or impossible to
determine, consider what award within the range the statute
provides would be sufficient to deter this defendant from further
infringement. °
• When statutory damages are awarded by a judge, he or she
should explain on the record why a particular award of statutory
damages is "just."32'
317. See, e.g., Arclightz & Films Pvt. Ltd. v. Video Palace, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 356, 363
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding statutory minimum award of $750 per infringed work was adequate
deterrence when considered in conjunction with attorney's fees award of over $20,000).
318. See, e.g., U.S. Media Corp. v. Edde Entm't Corp., No. 94 Civ. 4849(MBM)MHD, 1998
WL 401532, at *8, *11, *16 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1998) (awarding statutory damages that were
roughly twice the actual damages/profits where defendant was large-scale bootlegger of
films); Pret-A-Printee, Ltd. v. Allton Knitting Mills, Inc., No. 81 Civ. 3770 (WCC), 1982 WL
1788, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1982) (awarding $30,000 against repeat infringer, but not
$50,000 maximum); Lauratex Textile Corp. v. Allton Knitting Mills, 519 F. Supp. 730, 733
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (awarding statutory damages that were roughly eight times the actual
damages that the plaintiff had suffered from the defendant's infringement in part because
defendant was repeat infringer).
319. This requirement would be consistent with the common practice in patent cases, even
though the Patent Act is silent about the level of proof required for enhanced damage
awards. See, e.g., Accumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 483 F.3d 800, 804 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
320. We consider this principle to derive from the Supreme Court's due process
jurisprudence. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 584-85 (stating that courts
should consider whether a lesser award would adequately deter the defendant from
wrongdoing).
321. See, e.g., Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1017 (7th Cir. 1991)
("[C]oncerns of due process and the opportunity for meaningful, if limited, appellate review
contemplate that the district court would provide some explanation of the factual findings
that underlie this exercise of discretion to award greater than minimum statutory
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" Instruct juries to award statutory damages in a manner that
accords with the principles stated above.
" Although the principles we articulate in this Part will help
ensure that awards of copyright statutory damages are consistent
with principles of due process, courts should review such awards
under Gore and its progeny when presented with a timely
challenge on these grounds. 2
" Consider the impacts of such awards on freedom of speech and
expression and the interests of the public in ongoing inno-
vation.323
2. What Courts Should Not Do
In contrast, here are a number of principles that we think may
assist courts in avoiding problematic statutory damage awards in
copyright cases:
* Avoid the following technical mistakes in awarding statutory
damages:
- Do not award statutory damages without ensuring that
the plaintiff is actually eligible for such an award with
respect to the infringed work in question. 4
damages."). Some judges have done this. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Quests, Inc., 213 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 212, 219 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
322. Consistent with Cooper Industries, appellate courts should engage in de novo review
of a district court's ruling on the constitutionality of a damage award with respect to
substantive due process. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Toolgroup, Inc., 532 U.S. 424,
443 (2000).
323. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 17, at 268-72 (discussing impacts on investments in
innovation); Michael Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1096 (2007) (discussing
impacts of statutory damages on chilling free speech and free expression); Alfred Yen, A First
Amendment Perspective on the Construction of Third Party Copyright Liability, 51 B.C. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 14-15, on file with authors) (arguing that heightened
First Amendment concerns in the area of third party liability for copyright infringement
counsel stricter limits on the availability of presumed damages in these cases).
324. See, e.g., Derek Andrew, Inc. v. Poof Apparel Corp., 528 F.3d 696, 700-02 (9th Cir.
2008) (overturning an award of statutory damages because the plaintiff was ineligible for
them); see also Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 313 (2d Cir. 1992) (characterizing the
defendant as an egregious infringer and suggesting that Rogers should elect statutory
damages on remand even though Rogers was, in fact, ineligible for them).
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- Do not award statutory damages in addition to an award
of actual damages and profits under § 504(b).3 25
- Do not award statutory damages to compensate the
plaintiff for injuries that are not cognizable by U.S. copy-
right law, for example, reputational harm or privacy
intrusions. 6
- Do not award statutory damages on a "per infringement"
basis. The statute directs that they be awarded on a "per
work" basis.327
" Do not find the defendant's conduct to be "willful" and award
maximum statutory damages unless there is considerably more
evidence of reprehensibility than simply that the defendant knew
or should have known his conduct was infringing.
" Do not find the defendant's conduct "willful" and hence eligible
for enhanced statutory damages based upon a default judg-
ment.328 To justify an enhanced damage award, there should be
independent evidence of egregious conduct, not just a bare
allegation in the complaint.329
325. Plaintiffs may recover actual damages and defendants' profits or statutory damages,
but not all three. An example of this mistake is Roy Export Co. v. CBS, Inc., 503 F. Supp.
1137, 1155, 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (awarding damages, defendant's profits, and statutory
damages).
326. The plaintiff made this sort of misdirected argument in Engel v. Wild Oats, Inc., 644
F. Supp. 1089, 1092 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (plaintiff sought high statutory damage award in order
to be compensated for harm to her reputation from defendant's use of her art on T-shirts).
327. See SESAC, Inc. v. WPNT, 327 F. Supp. 2d 531, 531-32 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (referring to
statutory damages as based on "per infringement" although the broadcast of each work once
resulted in the same award as if the court had referred to the basis of infringement in "per
work" terms).
328. Examples of this unfortunate tendency include: Axact (Pvt), Ltd. v. Student Network
Res., Inc., No. 07-5491 (FLW), 2008 WL 4754907, at *1-3 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2008) (awarding
$300,000, the maximum statutory damages, against the off-shore operator of a website
containing academic research papers that both parties were selling to their customers on a
default judgment); Macklin v. Mueck, 373 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1335-36 (S.D. Fla. 2005)
(awarding maximum damages of $150,000 for each of two poems posted on the Internet on
a default judgment, despite magistrate's recommendation to award minimum damages of
$750 per work); Design Tex Group, Inc. v. U.S. Vinyl Mfg. Corp., No. 04 Civ. 5002 (JSR), 2005
WL 2063819, at *6, *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2005) (awarding $150,000 for infringement when
actual damages were $3,389); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Talisman Comm'cns, Inc., No. CV99-10450
RAP MCX, 2000 WL 364813, at *2, *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000) (awarding $300,000 as
maximum statutory damages on default judgment for unlicensed posting of sexualized
photographs on the defendant's website).
329. An example of this mistake is Macklin, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 1336.
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" Do not find the defendant's infringement to be willful on sum-
mary judgment. This question is one of fact upon which, if the
defendant denies willfulness, he may be entitled to trial.33 °
• Do not jump straight to the maximum statutory damage award
simply because the defendant's infringement is willful.331
Consider how egregious the infringement is, as compared with
other infringements for which statutory damages have been
awarded, before awarding the statutory maximum.
" Do not begin with $30,001 per infringed work as the statutory
damage minimum for willful infringements. 332 A finding of will-
fulness may justify an increased award toward the statutory
maximum but it does not change the applicable minimum. Nor
is it necessary for damages for willful infringement to be awarded
outside the "ordinary" infringement range if doing so would cause
the award to be disproportionate to the actual harm.333
" Do not commence a statutory damage analysis by considering the
applicable maximum (for the ordinary or the willful infringement
range) and working backwards from it if the defendant is not the
worst kind of offender.334
" Do not award statutory damages for the express or implicit
purpose of deterring other infringers who are not parties in the
case before the court.335
330. Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 472-73 (2d Cir. 1995) (reversing trial court's grant
of summary judgment on willful infringement).
331. An example of this unfortunate tendency is Greaver v. National Ass'n of Corporate
Directors, No. C.A. 94-2127 (WBB), 1997 WL 34605245, at *7 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 1997)
(awarding the maximum with no attempt to explain why such an award was justified).
332. An example of this mistake would seem to be the district court's decision in Zomba
Enterprises, Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 586 (6th Cir. 2007) (summarizing
the district court's decision). See supra note 233 and accompanying text for a discussion of
defendant's arguments that the district court in Zomba made the erroneous assumption that
a finding of willfulness shifted the appropriate minimum to $30,000.
333. See, e.g., Arcightz & Films Pvt. Ltd. v. Video Palace, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 356, 362-
63 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that minimum award would adequately deter this willful
infringer from further wrongs).
334. Cf. Childress v. Taylor, 798 F. Supp. 981, 997 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (considering, in
determining the appropriate statutory amount, the fact that the statutory maximum was not
necessary).
335. Awarding statutory damages for the express or implicit purpose of deterring other
infringers who are not before the court is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 352-53 (2007) (finding it a violation of due
process to punish defendant for harms done to others). A large award of statutory damages
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" Do not use large statutory damage awards to punish the defen-
dant for wrongs done by others to the same or similar plain-
tiffs. 3
36
" Do not find infringement to be willful in close cases, especially
not in close fair use cases when freedom of speech or of expres-
sion values are at stake.337
" Do not rely upon other maximum damage award cases that are
inconsistent with due process principles as justification for high
awards.3 8
may, however, stand as a warning to others, but the award made should be aimed at
deterring the defendant before the court, not giving the plaintiff a windfall in order to send
a message to others who might be tempted to infringe. An egregious example of this is the
MP3.com case in which the judge explicitly said he would award high statutory damages to
discourage other technology entrepreneurs from taking copyright risks of the sort MP3.com
had taken. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, No. 00 CIV. 472 (JSR), 2000 WL 1262568, at
*6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000). Judge Rakoff is not alone, however, in awarding statutory
damages in amounts aimed at deterring other potential infringers. See also Engel v. Wild
Oats, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1089, 1091 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Thus, in ruling on the admissibility of
evidence and proposed jury instructions, courts should be mindful of the Supreme Court's
due process jurisprudence regarding the permissible scope of deterrence in the civil remedial
context. In light of the Court's rulings in State Farm and Philip Morris, fact-finders should
focus on what remedy would have deterred the defendant before the court, rather than what
remedy will "send a message" to the public at large. Courts must be on guard to prevent
reliance on evidence regarding the behavior of other infringers or harms suffered by an
industry as a whole lest fact-finders be tempted to punish one defendant for misdeeds
committed by others. We thank Fred von Lohmann and Doug Lichtman for their insights on
this point.
336. This principle, like the previous one, is based on the Supreme Court's ruling in Philip
Morris v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007). In some p2p filesharing cases, judges sometimes
consider the harm that filesharing is doing to the entire recording industry instead of simply
the harm done by the particular defendant in the case before the court. See, e.g., BMG Music,
Inc. v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005). Other examples are the $1.92 million award
against Jammie Thomas and the $675,000 award against Joel Tenenbaum for filesharing.
See supra notes 13-14, 162 and accompanying text.
337. An example of an award that was insufficiently sensitive to these concerns is Los
Angeles Times v. Free Republic. No. 98-7840 MMIM AJWX, 2000 WL 1863566, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 16,2000) (awarding $1 million against website aimed at promoting critical commentary
on bias in news reporting). An example of a more free-speech-sensitive ruling is Religious
Technology Center v. Lerma, CIV.A. No. 95-1107-A, 1996 WL 633131, at *1, *15 (E.D. Va.
Oct. 4, 1996) (awarding minimum statutory damages for posting Scientology texts for
purposes of criticism).
338. Unsurprisingly, the plaintiff in Legg Mason relied heavily on MP3.com in support of
the $19.7 million award it received in Legg Mason. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition
to Defendant's Motion for a New Trial and Judgment as a Matter of Law at 33, Lowry's
Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455 (2003) No. WDQ 01-3898. Other
maximum award cases also cite prior maximum award cases. An example of this unfortunate
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Following these principles about what to do and what not to do
in making statutory damage awards will go a long way toward
making such awards in U.S. copyright cases both more just, as the
statute directs, and more consistent with due process principles.
C. Is There a Need for Legislative Reform?
Much of the mischief we have discerned in the current statutory
damage regime arises from the unholy melding of two distinct types
of impulses in one statutory provision: the perceived need for some
compensation when damages and profits are difficult to prove on
the one hand, and the need for a higher level of possible awards to
be imposed on egregious infringers on the other. This suggests that
it would be desirable for Congress to revisit § 504(c) and to amend
the law by separating into two different subsections provisions that
achieve these two different purposes and by giving more guidance
about the egregious circumstances that justify punitive levels of
enhanced damages. This change would structurally address a key
problem with the 1976 Act statutory damage regime.
If the statute had one provision for awarding statutory damages
in ordinary infringement cases and another for awarding enhanced
damages against egregious infringers, courts would be less likely to
continue the common practice of characterizing those with construc-
tive knowledge of infringement as willful infringers and awarding
grossly excessive or arbitrarily high awards as compared with the
actual damages sustained and awarded in other factually similar
cases. More guidance about circumstances that justify enhanced
awards might also contribute to more careful consideration of the
relationship between actual harm and the award of exemplary
damages, as the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence directs.
Courts should also have the power to lower statutory damages
below the current $750 minimum when an award based on this
minimum would be grossly disproportionate to the harm caused,
as in p2p filesharing cases.339 Congress should further consider
tendency is Axact (Pvt.), Ltd. v. Student Network Res., Inc., No. 07-5491(FLW), 2008 WL
4754907 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2008) (citing other maximum award cases in support of its
maximum statutory damage award).
339. Canada has such a rule, applicable in cases where multiple works have been
infringed in a"single medium." Canadian CopyrightAct, § 38.1(3) (2009); see also Wheatland,
2009] 509
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
limiting the availability of statutory damage awards in other
situations in which aggregation of claims would create a severe risk
of grossly excessive remedies, such as in class action and secondary
liability lawsuits.3
40
As part of a more general revision of copyright law, Congress
might even reconsider whether statutory damages serve a desirable
purpose in copyright law, given that the rules of evidence about
proof of damages and profits are much less rigorous now than they
were when statutory damages were first created341 and how few
other countries have statutory damage regimes. It might also con-
sider again whether, assuming it decided to retain such a regime,
statutory damages should be available to all copyright owners, not
merely those who have registered their claims of copyright within
three months of publication of their works. One alternative to the
enhanced statutory damage regime for willful infringement now
authorized by § 504(c) would be to give courts discretion to increase
awards up to two to three times the actual damage/profits recovery
as in other intellectual property regimes.342
CONCLUSION
The statutory damage regime of U.S. copyright law was originally
intended to provide some meaningful compensation to copyright
owners when it was difficult to prove actual damages or a defen-
dant's profits. The compensatory purpose of statutory damages
continues to be important, but, owing to the 1976 Act's creation of
an enhanced level of authorized statutory damages for willful
infringements, and the lack of principles to guide jury or judicial
deliberations on statutory damages, awards have too often been
arbitrary and inconsistent, and sometimes grossly excessive.
supra note 1. Barker has recommended legislation to "fix" the statutory damage regime so
that it will not produce grossly excessive awards in p2p filesharing cases. Barker, supra note
14, at 526.
340. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 17, at 316-17; Yen, supra note 323, at 14-15.
341. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 14.02[A][3], at 14-XX ("Uncertainty will not
preclude recovery of actual damages if the uncertainty is as to amount, not as to whether
actual damages are attributable to the infringement.").
342. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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It is rare for the law to give judges and juries such open-ended
discretion to award up to $150,000 in damages without any burden
of proof on the plaintiff to prove the fact or extent of the harms they
have suffered or the profits defendant has garnered. Judges can and
should develop a more principled approach to statutory damage
awards to be more consistent with Congress' intent in establishing
a tripartite and just statutory damage regime, with principles of
due process, and with international norms. The principles articu-
lated in this Article, which were largely drawn from the case law,
should give courts some guidance that will help to achieve the dual
goals of ensuring that copyright owners are able to recover reason-
able compensation and of avoiding arbitrary, excessive, and unfair
awards.
